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Abstract 
Since the breakup of the colonial empires following World War II, many newly 
independent states have embarked on a path of seeking political and economic 
development. Scholars studying this phenomenon soon became aware of an interesting 
puzzle. Why do the economies that have substantial natural resource endowments at their 
disposal tend to develop at a slower rate than economies that are less endowed with 
natural resources? From this question, the resource curse theory was derived. The 
resource curse theory has three main claims. The first claim is that resource rich 
economies grow at a slower rate than non-resource rich economies. The second claim is 
that resource rich states are more prone to conflict.1 The last claim, that resource rich 
states are more prone to corruption, will be addressed by this study. Using data on 
resource rents and resource exports, this study utilizes statistical modeling to test the 
relationship between natural resource endowments and corruption. This study finds that 
only fuel related natural resources have a statistically significant and negative 
relationship with perceptions of corruption due to asset specificity and relative scarcity.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 The first two claims have been well studied in the literature and are not the focus of this thesis. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
Why has corruption become a topic of interest for scholars? Over the last thirty 
years, numerous agencies and many scholars have begun to take the topic of corruption 
seriously. As a result of these efforts, numerous ratings agencies have created systems of 
measuring and comparing corruption across countries and over time. This has, in turn, 
allowed for the quantitative analysis of the determinants and effects of corruption. To 
begin, it is necessary to answer the following question. What is the effect of corruption on 
a state or an economy? 
 
The Effects of Corruption on the State 
 Two competing theories have emerged describing the effect of corruption on a 
state or on an economy. The first theory states that corruption actually has a positive 
effect on a given state or economy. It arises as the result of government policy failures 
and utilizes market mechanisms to correct them. The other theory is that corruption 
harms a given state or society. What follows is an examination of both perspectives on 
corruption. 
According to some scholars, corruption may be beneficial to society. If this is the 
case, is it worth paying close attention to? Many scholars have identified possible 
benefits of corruption. Leff (1964) makes the classic argument about the possible benefits 
of corruption. For Leff, corruption provides information about the effective political 
system whereas laws only provide information about the formal political system. 
Therefore, corruption is in effect the actual practice of government. Specifically, 
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corruption provides the means to avoid a bureaucracy that may be indifferent or hostile to 
the economy or to development. Corruption can also fill the void that may exist in a 
government bureaucracy that has other priorities. Leff also believes that corruption 
reduces uncertainty between investors and bureaucrats. This, in turn, is likely to increase 
the opportunities for investment. Corruption can also provide an avenue for innovation 
according to Leff. Entrepreneurs may, through graft, gain access to policy makers and 
bureaucrats and introduce innovation into the market before becoming established 
politically. Lastly, Leff views corruption as a hedge against bad government policy. 
Actors can engage in corruption to avoid them all together (8-11). 
Bayley (1966) echoes many of the claims of Leff and gives other scenarios in 
which corruption can be beneficial to a society. First, the opportunity to extract rents in a 
bureaucracy could serve to attract higher quality candidates to the bureaucracy. The rents 
can be treated as a portion of the wages earned. Therefore, a higher wage level should 
attract better candidates, ceteris paribus. The rents extracted from these corrupt 
exchanges, if they end up in banks, could serve to divert money from consumption to 
investment. The Marcos regime in the Philippines stole millions of dollars, which ended 
up in bank accounts in the West. These funds were then invested by the banks, possibly 
creating economic growth elsewehere. Corruption and nepotism may also serve as a 
substitute for a public works system and provide a means of giving the left-out a stake in 
the political system. In the context of states undergoing modernization, corruption may 
serve to reduce the hardships of transitioning from traditional to Western norms (727-
730). Klitgaard (1988) points out that corruption may help to introduce market forces in 
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the distribution of state goods, it may also foster political integration through payments, 
appointments, and policy formation, and finally, it can help organizations avoid 
constraining bureaucratic rules (31-33). Theobald (1990) echoes some of these supposed 
benefits of corruption. In terms of economic development, corruption may enhance 
capital formation, entrepreneurialism, reduction of red tape, and the introduction of 
market forces into the state sector. In terms of political development, corruption may help 
in the development of political parties, participation, and national integration (116-125). 
How have these claims stood up to empirical testing? There is a large and 
substantial body of empirical work that demonstrates the negative consequences of 
corruption. In terms of economic development, the negative consequences of corruption 
cannot be ignored. One consistent finding in the literature is that corruption reduces 
investment (Mauro, 1995; Gray and Kaufman, 1998; Wei, 2000; Habib and Zurawicki, 
2002). Firms, ceteris paribus, will prefer to invest in climates with the lowest risk and the 
highest return. The frequency and number of bribes paid become a cost to doing business 
and discourage investment. Corruption has also been found to decrease spending on 
education and health care (Tanzi and Davoodi, 1997; Mauro, 1998; Gupta et. al., 2002). 
Opportunities to engage in graft are not as great in education spending or health care 
spending, so funds tend to be diverted elsewhere. This has a negative effect on the ability 
of a state to develop human capital, which has adverse effects on development. Studies 
have also shown that states with higher rates of corruption tend to spend more on large 
public works projects as corruption creates the opportunity to profit substantially (Tanzi 
and Davoodi, 1997; Mauro, 1998).  
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Not surprisingly, corruption has also been linked to political instability (Mo, 
2001). Unstable political systems are generally unable to provide suitable climates for 
economic development. Similarly, corruption also undermines authority and distorts the 
ability of the state to collect revenues (Gary and Kaufman, 1998; Tanzi, 1998; Gupta et. 
al., 2002). This may lead to a situation where fewer firms are being taxed at a higher rate 
than would be if corruption were eliminated. Finally, corruption has been shown to have 
serious distributional consequences for citizens living in a corrupt state (Gupta, et. al., 
2002). 
Taken as a whole, all of these findings show many characteristics of corrupt states 
that can reduce economic growth. Quantitative scholarship has shown this to be true as 
well (Nas, 1986; Mauro, 1995; Tanzi and Davoodi, 1997; Mo, 2001; Gupta et. al., 2002). 
Unfortunately, corruption tends to spread throughout an economy rather than remain 
confined by a sector (Jain, 2002). Therefore, claims that corruption can be beneficial are 
highly questionable. More importantly, the manifestation of corruption in any portion of 
the state should be treated seriously by scholars due to the tendency for corruption to 
spread. 
Clearly, corruption is harmful to states and economies in which it has taken hold. 
Due to this, corruption is indeed a worthy topic of study for scholars. In an 
interdependent world, the negative effects of corruption are not likely to be contained in 
one economy, and spillover may occur. Therefore examining the causes, consequences, 
and remedies for corruption has both practical and scholarly value. 
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The Resource Curse Theory 
 Many different empirical studies have been conducted on the causes, the 
consequences, and remedies for corruption. Many of these studies will be reviewed in 
later chapters of this study. Of central interest to this paper, however, is the relationship 
between natural resource endowments and corruption. The developing world contains 
many states that have rich resource endowments. These endowments have long been 
viewed as a key asset to help many developing states, which typically have lower levels 
of human development, achieve a higher standard of living. After all, is it not better to 
have rich resource endowments than to have none? Yet, a strange phenomenon has been 
observed since the end of the Second World War. The developing states with abundant 
natural resources suffered from a myriad of problems that severely hindered their 
political and economic development. Numerous studies have demonstrated relationships 
among natural resource endowments, corruption, internal conflict, and low levels of 
economic growth. States which suffer from one of these outcomes face impediments to 
development. In this manner, they are cursed by their resource wealth. This is known as 
the paradox of plenty or the “resource curse theory.” 
 Providing insights into the problems of the developing world is an important 
endeavor for political scientists and economists alike. The world system is, after all, 
interdependent. Due to this phenomenon, the problems of one state rarely stay within that 
state. States that are prone to corruption are more likely to be a cause for concern in the 
global system. The Democratic Republic of the Congo provides an excellent example. 
Rife with corruption, the DRC cannot develop necessary institutions to adequately 
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govern. The needs of its citizens are routinely not met by the state, providing an 
atmosphere of discontent that fuels various separatist militias. Unfortunately, the 
Congolese are not the only people harmed by this conflict as it has spilled over into many 
of the neighboring states. If natural resource endowments are a determinant of these 
outcomes, then it represents an important topic of study. 
 To this end, this study will examine the relationships between natural resource 
abundance and corruption. In contrast to other studies on this topic, this research makes 
use of disaggregated resource rent measures. Therefore, this study can add more precision 
to the resource curse theory. Namely, what types of natural resources are associated with 
higher degrees of perceived corruption? Answering this question will provide important 
insights to economists and policy makers engaged in natural resource governance. If 
certain types of industries are prone to corruption, policy makers and development 
professionals can devise strategies to mitigate some of the negative consequences. It can 
also empower citizens of states with rich resource endowments to carefully scrutinize 
relationships between identified resource sectors and the state. 
 
Conclusion 
 Corruption is an important topic for study by political scientists and economists. A 
cursory examination of the literature clearly demonstrates the negative effects corruption 
has on developing states. Moving forward, this research intends to lay-out the linkages 
between natural resource endowments and corruption. To begin, it is necessary to review 
the existing literature on corruption. Chapter Two will examine definitions and typologies 
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of corruption that have been identified in the literature. Chapter Three is devoted to 
examining different theoretical perspectives on corruption and empirical research on the 
determinants of corruption. Chapter Four discusses the resource curse theory and how it 
relates to corruption. Chapter Five covers data collection and methodological issues 
relating to the statistical models this study will employ to test hypotheses. Chapter Six 
contains the outputs of the models used in this study along with an analysis of the results. 
Finally, Chapter Seven contains the conclusions of this study 
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Chapter Two 
Definitions and Typologies of Corruption 
 Corruption is a problem that occurs in all polities. Corruption may undermine 
effective governance and lead to deadweight loss in the economy. There is an extensive 
body of work related to the causes and effects of corruption. Many of these works are 
broad based and are not specific to particular industries or countries. Before beginning, it 
is essential to first provide a definition of corruption. Specifying a definition makes it 
possible to determine what to analyze and what to ignore. After reviewing different 
definitions of corruption, this chapter will then cover existing typologies of corruption. 
Combined, a review of definitions and typologies of corruption will allow for a careful 
examination of the different theoretical perspectives on corruption. 
 
Definitions of Corruption 
A review of the literature shows that defining corruption has proven difficult. 
Cockcroft (2012:3) observes that definitions of corruption range from “the decay of 
society to the single act of bribery.” Containing such a wide range of behaviors and 
activities makes it difficult to reach a consensus. Yet an outline has emerged in much of 
the scholarship on corruption that can be utilized as a baseline definition. Shleifer and 
Vishny (1998) offer a simple definition of corruption as the “sale by government officials 
of government property for personal gain” (91). This definition, while concise, has 
limitations. First, what is classified as government property? Does the provision of 
services and the granting of access count under this definition? This definition is also 
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silent on whether or not the act violates the law or the common good.  
The above definition is very similar to the definition of corruption used by the 
World Bank, which is the “abuse of public office for unauthorized private gain” (World 
Bank, 2000). By using the term abuse instead of sale, this definition covers a broader 
category of behavior. This definition also incorporates the term unauthorized, which 
allows researchers to compare the act with the legal code. Jain (2002:73) provides a 
definition that is nearly identical. For Jain, corruption “is an act in which the power of 
public office is used for personal gain in a manner that contravenes the rules of the 
game.” Is there a difference between unauthorized behavior and behavior that 
contravenes the rules of the game? “Unauthorized behavior” implies strict legal sanction 
whereas “contravenes the rules” of the game can be interpreted to include informal norms 
inherent to any institution. In these definitions, only government officials are guilty of 
corruption. Private actors, which can also be a beneficiary of a corrupt act, are absolved 
of responsibility. This is a serious shortcoming of defining corruption in that manner as 
private actors may initiate a corrupt exchange with a public employee. Furthermore, it is 
not clear what classifies as abuse or circumvention. Does this have to do with actually 
circumventing the law or acting in a manner inconsistent with the common good?  
While there are shortcomings to the above definitions, they form the traditional 
baseline definition of corruption. Yadav (2011) offers three amendments to the above 
definition to increase its validity. First, the public or political entities do not have to 
actually occupy an office. They may promise to abuse office upon being appointed or 
elected in exchange for support. Second, the gains from engaging in corruption can be 
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indirect. For example, gains from corruption may go to a collective group, such as a 
political party or an interest group as a whole rather than an individual member. Finally, 
the law does not have to specifically be violated for an act to be considered corrupt. 
Legislators may legally enact legislation that favors a group that offered prior 
compensation (5-6).  
della Porta and Vannucci (1999) offer a more concise version of the definition 
above. To them, corruption is a situation in which “there is a secret violation of a contract 
that, implicitly or explicitly, specifies a delegation of responsibility and the exercise of 
some discretionary power in an agent who, against the interests or preferences of the 
principal, acts in favor of a [corruptor], from which he receives a reward” (17). Two 
important aspects of corruption are implicitly identified in this definition. The first is that 
economic elites may try to leverage their wealth to seek public power and influence over 
policy. This is referred to as state capture. The other aspect is that political elites may 
leverage their positions to gain wealth. This is referred to as state predation (Spector, 
2012:5-6). This definition identifies actors in specific positions and utilizes the common 
good as a reference point. Referencing the common good is troubling, however. This 
requires investigators to identify the common good prior to identifying corrupt acts, but it 
is doubtful that a consensus could ever be reached on such a topic. 
Rogow and Lasswell (1978) offer a definition of corruption to address these 
particular situations. These authors define a corrupt act as an act that “violates 
responsibility toward at least one system of public or civic order and is in fact 
incompatible with and destructive of any such system” (54-55). A question emerges from 
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this definition for corruption. What kinds of acts are incompatible with and destructive of 
public or civic order? Can an act betray a system of public order but not be incompatible 
with it or destructive to it? Consider an act that circumvents an existing law that is 
harmful to the public good. Would this be considered corrupt? Like the definition given 
by della Porta and Vannucci, basing a definition off of an ideal common good presents 
challenges. 
Certainly there are many other definitions of corruption that exist in the literature. 
The survey of definitions above, however, is enough to raise important questions. First, 
does an act have to be in violation of legal statutes to be considered corrupt? Second, 
does the act have to be in exchange for some type of benefit? Third, does the act have to 
be contrary to the public good? Different opinions on these three questions can produce 
varying definitions that would disagree on many types of exchanges. 
 
Typologies of Corruption 
While there seems to be a general outline of corrupt behavior, the above 
definitions are not enough to effectively categorize corrupt acts. As Vogl states, 
“Corruption is not a single event, but a continuum” (2012:12). Therefore, typologies are 
needed to classify corruption in terms of degree. A number of scholars have offered 
different typologies to capture the various forms of corruption. This section reviews and 
synthesizes the literature. 
The first typology to be covered was introduced by Theobald (1990). He chose to 
classify corrupt acts based upon the principles they betrayed: public office, public 
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interest, and public opinion. The public office typology is based upon Max Weber’s ideal 
type of rational-legal bureaucracy (2). At the core of this ideal typology is the assumption 
that bureaucrats are expected to be impartial, to be impersonal, and to accept the strict 
separation between the incumbent and the office. Deviations from this model are 
generally seen as being corrupt. This typology tends to view corruption as an individual 
act rather than a system of behavior. It is also the easiest to classify, as any bureaucracy 
should have a codified system of rules that determine what is legal and what is not. The 
public interest typology of corruption includes any act that can be said to betray the 
common good (5-6). Classifying corruption in this manner can present challenges. First, 
scholars must have a clear idea of what type of behavior is in the public good. Second, 
certain behaviors may be in the common interest but against the law and, on the other 
hand, certain lawful acts may be against the common interest. 
The last typology of corruption identified by Theobald is called the public opinion 
conception. This type of corruption classifies an act as corrupt if public opinion in a given 
society would judge it to be corrupt. Three types of the public opinion conception of 
corruption exist: black corruption, gray corruption, and white corruption. The differences 
between the three types depend on how they are perceived by elites and how they are 
perceived by the masses. Black corruption is corruption that elites and the masses 
condemn. Gray corruption is corruption that one group condemns, usually elites, and one 
group is ambiguous about. Finally, white corruption is an act of corruption that is seen as 
unworthy of punishment by the majority (6). Like the public interest conception, the 
public opinion conception could be difficult to apply. Survey data could provide evidence 
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into public opinion at a given time, but it would take time to carry out such a survey for 
each action. It may also be difficult to judge who qualifies as an elite and who does not. 
Alam (1989) introduces a typology based upon the ways in which government 
officials distort legally prescribed interactions between an actor’s claim to benefits and 
costs an actor must bear. Stated differently, officials can seek to deny rights or absolve 
obligations for some form of compensation. From this framework, four types of 
corruption are identified by Alam. The first is cost-reducing corruption. This type of 
corruption is best represented by situations where a government official grants tax 
reductions or is lax in the enforcement of regulations. The second type of corruption is 
cost-enhancing corruption. This type of corruption occurs when an official has control 
over the provision or administration of a good or service and charges a cost for their use. 
An example of this type of corruption is when an official will only issue a license for a 
bribe. The next two types of corruption relate to the distribution of benefits. First is 
benefit-reducing corruption. This type of corruption occurs whenever an official transfers 
excess benefits to an actor. This could include over reporting work done to pay out more 
monetary rewards. This is common in nepotism and patronage. The second type is 
benefit-reducing corruption. Benefit-reducing corruption includes acts in which a 
government official appropriates goods that were intended for an actor. For example, the 
theft of medical supplies would count as benefit-reducing corruption (442-443). This 
typology is limited however in that it only recognizes the corruption of state functions. It 
does not recognize private sector corruption. Furthermore, it uses the law and policies as 
its baseline for judging an act to be corrupt or not. Many types of lobbying would not be 
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covered by this typology. 
Aidt (2003) created a typology of corruption based upon two different factors. The 
first factor is the degree of benevolence of an official tasked with implementing a policy 
or designing an institution. The second factor is whether the determinant of the level of 
corruption is institutional or historical. From these factors, Aidt identifies four different 
categories of corruption. The first is efficient corruption. Efficient corruption facilitates 
beneficial interactions between different actors that could not be possible otherwise. 
Theoretically, efficient corruption promotes efficiency in the allocation of goods that may 
arise from pre-existing state failures. Next is corruption with a benevolent principal. This 
type of corruption occurs when a benevolent actor grants discretionary power to a non-
benevolent actor. The degree of corruption in this type depends upon whether the 
institution was designed optimally. Corruption with a non-benevolent principal is the next 
category of corruption. This occurs when a non-benevolent actor introduces inefficient 
policies in order to extract rents. The degree of corruption in this type depends on the 
incentive structures that exist within existing institutions. Lastly, Aidt identifies self-
reinforcing corruption. This type of corruption depends on the levels of corruption in the 
past and depends on history (F633). This typology has the most use when diagnosing 
strategies for addressing corruption. Solutions are implicit in the definitions of the first 
three types. The fourth type of corruption in this typology, however, does not have an 
easy solution. 
Other scholars have offered typologies based upon the frequency, the duration, 
and the amount of resources at stake. Using those dimensions, della Porta and Vannucci 
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(2012) identify four types of corruption. The first is petty corruption. Petty corruption 
occurs at a low frequency or a short duration and involves a small amount of resources. 
An example of this could be an officer taking a bribe for a ticket. Individual corruption 
occurs at a short frequency or a low duration but involves a large amount of resources. 
This could be a high level bureaucrat granting a license for resource extraction for a large 
sum of money. Structural corruption occurs at a high frequency or a long duration and 
involves a small amount of resources. An example of this type of corruption could be an 
entire bureaucracy that charges a small fee for service delivery. Lastly, systemic 
corruption occurs at a high frequency or a long duration and involves a large amount of 
resources. This type of corruption could be represented by a political regime that 
systematically utilizes political appointments to accrue vast amount of wealth (37-39). 
There is still a bit of ambiguity in this typology. Measuring differences in frequency, 
duration, and the amount of resources at stake involves a degree of subjectivity and 
relativism. If baselines could be established, however, this problem could be solved at the 
state level. Whether this typology would be useful for cross-national studies is difficult to 
say. 
For the purposes of this study, it is useful to make use of the traditional definition 
of corruption utilized by the World Bank. Many of the cross national surveys created to 
make comparisons of corruption use this definition which will allow this study to 
generalize with the surveys. This study also incorporates Theobald’s typology of 
corruption, specifically the public office conception. Like the World Bank definition, this 
typology is common in much of the empirical work that has been done and will allow this 
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study to contribute to that wide body of literature. 
 
Conclusion 
 Defining and categorizing corruption has proven to be a challenge for scholars 
studying this phenomenon. When the definition of corruption is written narrowly, it can 
aid in the examination of a specific type, but it loses the ability to view corruption 
systemically. When the definition of corruption is written too broadly, however, scholars 
can become overwhelmed by the many different types of corruption. It seems like it 
would be helpful to try to define corruption based upon the environments with which it 
occurs. For example, bureaucratic corruption will differ from private sector corruption. 
By doing this, scholars may be able to build theories within these domains and perhaps 
make linkages between the two. 
 The typologies covered in this chapter all offer important insights into looking at 
corruption. To create a typology, however, one must identify a baseline to judge an act as 
corrupt. All of the above typologies could be utilized to fully examine different corrupt 
acts. The benefit of doing so is that the typologies contain insights into the motivations 
behind and the consequences of a corrupt act. This can give scholars and policy makers 
insights on how to prevent bureaucrats and politicians from engaging in corruption. 
 To summarize, all of the definitions of and the typologies of corruption have 
utility. Scholars must think clearly and carefully about what specific types of corruption 
they wish to study and select the definition and typology that will provide the most 
leverage to their research program. 
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Chapter Three 
Theoretical Perspectives and Determinants of Corruption 
 Definitions and typologies are useful for identifying and classifying corruption. 
They do not, however, answer a fundamental question about corruption. Namely, why 
does corruption occur? Scholars have given different explanations for why an actor may 
engage in corruption. Broadly, they fall into three categories: 1) political-economic or 
rational choice, 2) sociocultural, and 3) neo-institutional. Following an analysis of the 
theoretical paradigms, the empirical record will be engaged to identify the determinants 
of corruption.2 
 
Theoretical Perspectives on Corruption 
The political-economic model of corruption was first identified by Rose-
Ackerman (1978) who provides a starting point from which most scholarship on the 
topic. As a rational-choice model, Rose-Ackerman’s model focuses primarily on 
structural incentives and agency relationships (5-6). Three types of actors are specified in 
this model. First is the superior. Superiors have a set of preferences which relate to 
desired outcomes. Second, there are agents are directed by superiors to achieve these 
outcomes. Lastly, there are third parties that seek to influence an agent’s decision. 
Monitoring can be costly to the superior. The larger a bureaucracy is, the higher the costs 
to monitor it. Therefore, agents obtain a degree of freedom from the preferences and 
outcomes desired by the superior. The more freedom there is, the greater the potential 
                                                 
2 The theories on the resource curse and corruption, which are central to this study, are covered in Chapter 
Four. 
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supply of corruption. The demand for corruption comes from the third party. For the third 
party, corrupting an existing law is likely more cost effective than obtaining power to 
impose a new set of rules (6-9). Della Porta and Vannucci (1999) utilize a similar model 
of corruption that involves similar categories of actors. Instead of superiors, agents, and 
third parties, della Porta and Vannucci use a model that includes principals, agents, and 
corruptors respectively (16-17).   
This model is exclusively a micro-level theory. On the supply side, corruption can 
be treated as an additional transaction cost imposed upon producers. In a basic supply and 
demand curve, the cost of the bribe or rent causes the price of a good to increase. This 
will negatively impact the demand function for a good, causing less to be produced at a 
higher cost to society (Shleifer, 1998:94). On the demand side, firms wish to avoid 
competition and will behave in a manner similar to a monopoly. They can be expected to 
pass on inefficiency to consumers by either producing less or charging more or both. 
Again, dead weight loss will occur with respect to the overall welfare of society 
(Lambsdorff, 2007:115). Implicit in this model of corruption is that human beings are 
rational, utility maximizing actors. If the probability of being caught and the punishment 
associated with being caught is less than the payoff of engaging in a corrupt act, one 
should expect the agent to engage in corruption. 
Under what conditions is corruption most likely to occur in the political-economic 
theoretical perspective? Corruption thrives in situations involving asymmetries in 
information, bargaining power, and enforcement. When information is precious and 
difficult to obtain, corruption is likely to occur. If there is a high opportunity cost to 
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bargaining, then corruption is likely to occur. Lastly when monitoring and enforcing the 
law is costly or risky, corruption is likely to occur (della Porta and Vannucci, 2012:20-
27). There are specific contexts in which corruption has been shown to flourish as well. 
Another situation that lends itself to corruption is a situation in which there is 
competition between state officials and consumers (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993). One such 
example is a transition economy that has a mixture of controlled prices and market prices. 
The systems can create a dynamic where the rewards of entrepreneurship and investment 
decline against the returns to rent-seeking (Bardhan, 1997). Specific institutional 
situations can create incentives to engage in corruption as well. The way the state 
operates; the role of the state in licensing, permitting, authorizations, and granting 
monopoly power; and the structure of tax collection can all have a dramatic impact on the 
development of corruption (Tanzi, 1998:563-567). Tangentially related to institutional 
characteristics, civil servant pay has been shown to be correlated with perceptions of 
corruption. When the average pay of a civil service worker is low, perceptions of 
corruption should be high (Van Rijckeghem et. al, 2001).  
The availability of rents seems to have a great deal of explanatory power in this 
regard. Rents become available under circumstances in which government intervention 
can lead to the presence of excessive profits. Types of government behavior that cause 
rents include: tariffs, import quotas, subsidies, tax deductions, price controls, multiple 
exchange rate practices, multiple foreign exchange allocation schemes, government 
controlled provision of credit, and natural resource abundance (Mauro, 1998). Ades and 
Di Tella utilize a cross sectional analysis of thirty one countries utilizing a variety of 
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control variables and find that countries where firms enjoy higher rents tend to have 
higher corruption levels (1999). Lastly, there is a preference by the suppliers of 
corruption, bureaucrats or politicians, to benefit from existing sources of rent-seeking 
rather than to create new forms of rent-seeking behavior (McChesney, 1997:24). 
From a political-economic perspective, combating corruption is about changing 
incentive structures. Many measures could accomplish this. On the demand side, scholars 
have recommended scaling down regulations, streamlining the tax code, creating 
transparency in the bureaucracy, and eliminating discretion on the part of the bureaucracy 
(Kaufmann, 1997:128; Tanzi, 1998:590-591). To address the supply side of corruption, 
scholars have recommended increasing public sector wages, implementing effective 
monitoring systems, and changing the system of rewards and penalties (Bardhan, 
1997:1330-1340; Klitgaard, 1998:77; Tanzi, 1998:590-591). Establishing a system of 
perfect monitoring is costly, however. Therefore, a trade-off must be made between the 
cost of monitoring and the cost of corruption. Completely eliminating corruption may 
cost more in terms of monitoring agents than allowing some corruption to occur. Ideally, 
an equilibrium point should be sought in which the cost of monitoring agents plus the 
cost of corruption occurring is the lowest. 
Many of these recommendations seem to imply neoliberal reforms as a solution to 
corruption. Markets, however, may be an inadequate mechanism for controlling and 
combating corruption. Privatization itself opens up multiple opportunities for actors to 
engage in large scale corruption. Many of the states that appear as clean on Transparency 
International’s Corruption Perceptions Index are not neoliberal states. It is likely that 
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solutions for corruption will be context specific. Like economic development, there is not 
a one size fits all solution. 
There are criticisms of the political-economic theoretical perspective of 
corruption. Actually modeling corruption could prove to be quite challenging. 
Hypothetically, many variables interact in the cost function and the monitoring function 
of corruption. To adequately do so, it would be necessary to know how much corruption 
is occurring. Being a clandestine activity, this could prove to be difficult. Furthermore, 
cultural and ethical beliefs will be absent from such a model. This will severely 
undermine the predictive power of the model. 
Cultural and ethical variables are largely ignored in this perspective. Ignoring 
culture and ethics can undermine the predictive power of this theoretical perspective. 
Imagine two bureaucratic situations. In the first, a great deal of discretionary power is 
given to agents with a strong cultural or ethical bias against corruption. In the second, 
less discretionary power is given to agents with no cultural or ethical bias against 
corruption. In which situation will there be a higher incidence of corruption? We would 
assume the second example, but this perspective may not be able to adequately answer 
that question. 
The next theoretical perspective on corruption is the sociocultural perspective. 
This perspective emphasizes cultural traditions, social norms, and internalized values that 
inform moral preferences and societal roles. In this perspective, individuals are pushed 
toward corruption by the attributes of their internalized values and by the social norms 
that exert influence on individuals (della Porta and Vannucci, 2012:12-14). In this 
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theoretical perspective individuals are not assumed to be rational, utility maximizing 
actors. Rather, actors are viewed as acting within a set of socially constructed norms that 
prescribe behavior. This behavior can be ego centric or oriented toward group survival. It 
can be bound by kinship groups, ethnicity, religious affiliation, or economic class. 
Inherent in this model is the tension between an idealized Weberian bureaucracy 
and more traditional modes of resource allocation. Due to this, corruption is judged based 
upon Western norms of bureaucratic behavior. The danger in examining corruption in this 
manner is that it can lead to ethnocentrism. In some political systems, actions that are 
deemed as corrupt can serve to link groups to the emerging or modernizing state. So 
while there may be a cost passed on in terms of the delivery of goods and services, the 
potential benefit of linking citizens to the state through patronage networks is hard to 
measure. Another problem with this theoretical perspective is that it becomes difficult to 
separate the behavior of an agent and a group as a whole. If a bureaucratic agent engages 
in corruption, does it mean the agent is culturally predisposed to corruption or is the agent 
merely responding to an incentive structure that allows the agent to do so? Furthermore, 
like many cultural or constructivist theories, it is difficult to determine the causal 
direction due to the agent-structure problem.  
Curbing corruption in this model comes down to changing cultural perspectives 
and norms about corruption. If corruption stems from sociocultural systems, then 
changing attitudes seems to be the only way to reduce corruption (Klitgaard, 1988:90; 
Theobald, 1990:148). Building trust has also been shown to  reduce corruption though 
there are limitations of this approach in fractionalized states (Rothstein and Uslaner, 
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2005). This makes the prospects for reducing or eliminating corruption very difficult, as 
cultures do not tend to change quickly. Furthermore, this could be interpreted as telling 
members of a group to behave in a more Weberian or Western manner. At best, 
proponents of this theory of corruption would recommend patience and understanding 
when dealing with a presumably corrupt bureaucracy and not expect dramatic change 
over time. This stands counter to examples of successful anti-corruption campaigns. 
Singapore provides an excellent example. Rife with corruption in the post-World War II 
era, the newly elected People’s Action Party enacted the Prevention of Corruption 
Ordinance and created an autonomous agency called the Corrupt Practices Investigation 
Bureau. As a result, corruption was reduced to an “almost negligible proportion in 
contemporary Singapore” (Quah, 1982:162-163). 
The last theoretical explanation is the neo-institutional perspective. della Porta 
and Vannucci (2012) provide an example of this theoretical perspective. This approach is 
similar to the political-economic approach except that it attempts to incorporate macro 
level phenomena and path dependency. By doing so, this theoretical explanation attempts 
to bridge the micro-macro divide. Once a certain organizational structure and the cultural 
norms that develop along with it are put into place, governance structures and 
enforcement mechanisms develop within networks that conduct illegal actions. This 
reduces uncertainty among actors and increases the chances that actors will engage in 
illegal acts (12-14). 
Since this theoretical perspective incorporates aspects of both the political-
economic theory of corruption and the cultural perspective of corruption, the situations in 
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which corruption occurs in the neo-institutional perspective are shared between both 
perspectives. Similarly, the recommendations for combating corruption under this 
perspective are also shared with the other two theoretical perspectives. 
Only by thoroughly examining the institutional settings and the history of past 
corrupt practices can this perspective on corruption be utilized. In this sense, it is harder 
to generalize from case to case because context matters a great deal. Due to this difficulty, 
it is not likely that a general theory of corruption can be developed from the neo-
institutional perspective. Furthermore, corrupt acts typically occur in a clandestine nature. 
This makes it difficult to fully utilize this theoretical perspective as it is unlikely a 
research will have a complete understanding of the corruption occurring within a 
contemporary bureaucratic structure. This method is better suited for historical cases of 
corruption in which a more information is available for scrutiny. 
After examining the strengths and limitations of each theoretical perspective, this 
study will make use of a political-economic approach to corruption. It provides the best 
opportunity to model corruption in a large-N data set and control for relevant variables 
identified in the literature. 
 
Determinants of Corruption 
With a theoretical perspective selected, it is now important to discuss some other 
factors that may have an impact on corruption. Once identified, these determinants can 
then be measured and incorporated into the model that will be developed later in this 
study. Scholarship has been conducted on the many different possible causes of 
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corruption. The following were found to be determinants of corruption in other studies:  
the level of democracy, the rule of law, gross domestic product per capita or poverty, the 
size of the population, government consumption, trade openness, and ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization. 
 Democracy has been shown to have a negative impact on corruption. If members 
of a given polity are able to identify corrupt politicians and have them removed from 
office, corruption should abate over time. There are many assumptions inherent to this 
line of reasoning. First is the assumption that the means to expose corruption exist. The 
right of a free press, which is important in exposing corruption, is one reason why 
democracy may lower corruption. Another assumption is that the electoral process is free 
and fair, allowing voters to punish parties that are unwilling or unable to tackle corruption 
within the government. Utilizing data from a large set of countries over a fifteen year 
period, Rock (2009) is able to show that an inverted U relationship exists between 
democracy and corruption. In newer democracies, corruption tends to fall rather quickly. 
In consolidated democracies, there is a tendency for corruption to increase slightly over 
time. This means that it is absolutely necessary that a measure of democracy is included 
in this research model. The predictability of the rules of the game are also important for 
determining corruption. Consolidated regimes are more likely to have established rules in 
place. Consolidated regimes may also be able to articulate preferences and exert more 
leverage vis-à-vis private entities. Why is there a discrepancy between the empirical 
findings of Rock and this theoretical assumption? Actors over time will adapt to changing 
political and economic contexts. As a regime becomes consolidated, it develops more 
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capacity. However, actors adapt to these changes and develop more sophisticated 
methods of engaging in graft. Micro-level, incentive shaping factors will then come into 
play to determine outcomes of corruption. Therefore, a measure for regime durability or 
consolidation is necessary for a complete analysis of corruption though it is important to 
understand that over long periods of time, its explanatory value will diminish. 
Poverty exacerbates corruption because it undermines the ability of government 
institutions to function effectively. Control of corruption, rule of law, government 
effectiveness, voice and accountability, and political stability were all found to be 
negatively impacted in strong ways by poverty rates (Tebaldi, 2010). When faced with 
survival issues, government workers, as utility maximizers, are also likely to engage in 
rent-seeking behavior in order to make ends meet. Furthermore, an impoverished country 
is not likely to have the resources available to create a professional bureaucracy. Poverty 
also creates an incentive to engage in corruption to improve income. Access to education 
and sound legal systems are clearly undermined by poverty, impacting the decision 
making of potential suppliers of corruption and the ability to hold suppliers of corruption 
to account. The per capita income of a state can be used to capture this relationship. 
The relationship between the size of a state’s population and corruption is a topic 
of debate within the literature. There are a couple of theoretical reasons why one would 
anticipate a higher level of corruption in states with more people. Many of these 
theoretical arguments were analyzed and tested by Knack and Azfar (2003). First, a state 
with more citizens has a larger demand for the provision of services, which are scarce. 
Therefore, citizens may engage in corruption in order to gain access to a limited pool of 
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state services. In more populous states there are also less government workers per citizen. 
Therefore, citizens may be tempted to bribe government workers to jump ahead in a 
presumed queue. The empirical results of the authors’ regression models were mixed, 
however (10). They attribute this to selection bias in the data available from the 
corruption measuring indexes. Many years have passed since this study, so it may be 
appropriate to retest these relationships. 
The amount of government spending might also influence the incentive to engage 
in corrupt behavior. This is a tenet of classical liberalism where the state only distorts 
economic activity. Economists of the public choice and the rent-seeking schools see most 
government spending as inherently wasteful and prone to rent-seeking opportunism. Goel 
and Nelson (1998) use a logit model to analyze panel data on the number of corruption 
convictions in the United States and the size of state spending. Their results demonstrate 
a positive and significant relationship between local government spending and corruption 
convictions while controlling for many measures of judicial monitoring and enforcement 
(115). In a separate study, Gupta et. al. (2001) seek to analyze the relationship between 
military spending, government spending, and corruption for a data set of 120 countries 
from 1985-1998. Their findings demonstrate a positive and statistically significant 
relationship with military spending as a share of GDP, military spending as a share of 
government expenditures, government procurement outlays as a percentage of GDP, and 
government spending (759-771). These studies are not conclusive due to a focus on just 
the United States in the former and a small sample size in the latter. However the logic is 
straight forward. The more resources a state has at its disposal, the greater the incentive to 
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engage in corrupt practices. Therefore, any model on corruption should include some 
measure of government spending. 
Trade openness has also been identified as having a negative impact on 
corruption. Trade restrictions shift resources to rent seeking activities, which increases 
corruption. Utilizing the International Country Risk Guide and Transparency 
International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, Torrez (2002) finds a mixed relationship. 
The negative relationship between the International Country Risk Guide and trade 
openness was found to non-existent to weak depending on how openness is measured. He 
does find the relationship holds with the Transparency International measure, but the 
number of observations is very low. 
Ethno linguistic fractionalization has been found to be highly correlated with 
corruption in different studies. Controlling for various measures of bureaucratic 
efficiency, Mauro (1995) finds that ethnolinguistic fractionalization is correlated with 
corruption. The presence of different ethnic groups may lead bureaucrats to favor 
members of their group over others (693). Dincer (2008) finds evidence that ethnic and 
religious polarization and ethnic and religious fractionalization are also associated with 
corruption in the United States controlling for educational attainment levels, income 
inequality, and the size of the manufacturing sector. Like Mauro, Dincer argues that this 
is due to the likelihood that members of a group will allocate resources to their own 
group (98). Therefore, any model predicting corruption should include ethno linguistic 
fractionalization to capture this effect. 
To summarize, the above factors should be accounted for in any study of 
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corruption. A failure to do so may create an omitted variable bias and decrease the 
explanatory power of the model. 
 
Conclusion 
 Three different theoretical perspectives on corruption have been identified in the 
literature: political-economic, cultural, and neo-institutional. In order to make 
generalizations across cases of corruption, this study will utilize a political-economic 
theoretical perspective on corruption. The cultural and the neo-institutional models of 
corruption require close attention to context and history, making generalizations from 
case to case difficult. Furthermore, reviewing the empirical research record on corruption 
shows that the political-economic approach is common and has generated a large body of 
work on the determinants of corruption. This study will incorporate these finds to build a 
statistical model to test whether or not natural resource endowments demonstrate a 
significant relationship with perceptions of corruption. 
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Chapter Four 
The Resource Curse Theory and Corruption 
 What are the theoretical linkages between natural resources and corruption? From 
a political-economic perspective, incentive structures provide the most insight into 
determining the total level of corruption in a given state or economy. A state with a large 
amount of natural resource endowments relative to its economy could provide both more 
opportunities to engage in rent seeking behavior and greater gains from engaging in 
corruption. Therefore, a clear theoretical link may exist between the political-economic 
perspective on corruption and the resource curse theory. To examine whether this 
potential link has merit, it is first necessary to examine the existing literature on the 
resource curse theory. Once this literature has been reviewed, this chapter will build a 
link between resource rents and corruption and construct a theoretical model to capture 
this relationship. 
 
The Resource Curse Theory  
To sustain economic development, countries need access to natural materials that 
can be exploited. The more richly endowed a country is, the greater the prospects for the 
economic development of that country. This line of reasoning seems straight forward. If 
one could choose a starting point from which to found a new country, one would likely 
want ample farmland, timber, minerals, hydrocarbons, and any other resource useful for 
providing for development. The management of these resources, whether through 
cultivation, mining, or drilling, brings with it spillover into the broader economy. As 
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these processes become more efficient due to market forces, economies of scale or simply 
learning by doing, less labor will be required to produce the same if not greater output. 
This should, in turn, also cause the prices of these commodities to fall. Because these 
commodities are inputs to so many different goods, the overall price level should fall over 
time. Meanwhile, the newly freed labor can be then shifted into different sectors in the 
economy, which should respond to the growing demand for goods that are becoming 
cheaper. As the resource endowments gradually diminish, as all certainly do, the output 
that would have been generated is replaced by the output of both a more skilled 
workforce and a more diversified economy. For all intents and purposes, this model put 
forth by Ginsburg (1957) provides the argument for the conventional view of how a large 
natural resource endowment should benefit a given country when it is in the early stages 
of economic development. 
 There are many assumptions inherent to the model mentioned above. First, there 
is an assumption that the efficiency benefits that occur in these economic sectors are 
enjoyed in the host country. If the host country is not willing or able to turn these raw 
commodities into finished goods for sale, will the host country benefit? A country that 
exports copper ore but imports copper semiconductors, for example, is likely to pay more 
for the semiconductor than it was paid for the copper ore. Should a country become 
dependent on mineral extraction without a subsequent diversifying of the economy, it 
may become burdened with a bloated mining sector or high unemployment. This can be 
applied to other extractive sectors of the economy. What if the earnings from these 
resources are not reinvested in the economy or distributed as wages to workers in the 
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extractive sector? If these earnings are instead stolen through corruption, the natural 
resource endowments may not provide the assumed benefits. Political violence can also 
develop over land ownership rights that contain rich resource endowments. These 
conflicts can lead to civil wars or secession movements. All of these outcomes will have a 
negative impact not only on economic growth but also the political system in general. In 
this scenario, when the resources begin to diminish, the hypothetical country could be set 
up for a difficult situation. 
 The above criticisms of the conventional view of how resource endowments can 
benefit early stage economic development form the basis of the resource curse theory as 
it relates to growth and development. A great deal of scholarship has been done on this 
subject. The post-World War II era provides a starting point to analyze the claims of this 
theory as many countries became independent and sought to utilize their resource wealth, 
if they had it, to pursue economic development. Using the geographical size of a country 
as a proxy for resource endowments, Auty (1993:2) found that the smaller, and thus 
resource deficient countries like Korea and Taiwan performed much better economically 
than China, India, Brazil, and Mexico. Auty claims that all six of these countries began 
with similar economic models, namely autarkic industrial policy or import-substitution 
industrialization3. Korea and Taiwan, due to mineral deficiencies, quickly had to adopt a 
more export oriented policy because of the negative terms of trade associated with a 
reliance on commodity exports. Autarkic models of development require a great deal of 
financing to support tariff regimes and other forms of protection. Therefore, these 
                                                 
3 Import-substitution industrialization refers to a strategy of economic development in which the state 
utilizes trade barriers to encourage domestic production of goods for the internal consumer market. This 
was prominent in Latin America from the 1950s until the 1970s. 
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countries ran into foreign exchanges shortages more quickly than their resource rich 
counterparts (Auty, 1993:2). Because South Korea and Taiwan switched to a more 
competitive model quickly, fewer imbalances built up in their economies than in China, 
India, Brazil, and Mexico. Therefore South Korea and Taiwan were better off as the 
switch in economic models was more costly for the larger countries. Furthermore the 
growth rates of South Korea and Taiwan during this period were much higher than those 
of China, India, Brazil, and Mexico. Today these two countries enjoy a higher standard of 
living as well. There are other reasons why this could have occurred, however. The 
geopolitical decisions of the United States during the Cold War could have influenced 
this outcome as well. Concerned about communist resistance movements developing in 
East Asia, the United States provided special access to the United States domestic market 
and development assistance to Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. The other four countries 
in this case study did not receive this preferential treatment by the world’s largest 
domestic market. Lastly, geographic size is a poor operationalization of resource wealth 
as there are many resource deficient yet large countries like Chad and Niger. 
 The above framework operationalized resource wealth as a function of the actual 
geographic size of a country. How does this thesis fare when it is made sector specific? 
Are there characteristics of extractive industries that lend themselves to economic under 
performance? Scholars have identified characteristics of these industries that can lead to 
poor economic performance. The first relates to the amount of capital required to engage 
in extractive activity. If we again begin in the post-World War II era, we find mineral rich 
countries that lack the capital necessary to exploit these endowments. The capital must, 
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then, come from developed countries. These sectors will employ a small portion of the 
labor force and likely export the extracted resource without any value added labor. An 
enclave economy is likely to develop, which will have limited to no linkages to the 
domestic economy. Thus, spillover effects will be largely mitigated. Furthermore, the 
earnings on the commodity exports can be lost to either the service on the foreign capital 
investment or negative terms of trade (Prebisch, 1950; Singer, 1950; Auty, 1993:3).  
Empirical research provides support to both of the above claims. Manzano and 
Rigobon (2001) utilize scatter plot to show a relationship between resource abundance 
and debt growth from 1975 and 1985. This study also shows a steep decline in the price 
of many commodities over the same period (22-23). Many developing states leveraged 
their resource wealth during this period, leaving them with high levels of debt. There is 
also empirical evidence showing that the terms of trade between primary commodities 
and manufactured goods has deteriorated since the Second World War. Utilizing data 
from the United Nations and the World Bank, Spraos (1980) found that the terms of trade 
between primary products and manufactured goods had declined since World War II 
regardless of the data source (122). The model utilized by Spraos was scrutinized by 
Sapsford (1985) for containing structural instability in the parameters used to analyze the 
terms of trade over the period covered. Sapsford corrects for this by utilizing a Cochrane-
Orcutt model to bridge the gaps between the two sub periods in Spraos’ work (783). The 
new model confirms the findings of Spraos that the terms of trade between primary 
commodity goods and manufactured goods declined until the 1980s. These results 
generated a great deal of controversy in the economics literature due to its anti-orthodox 
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policy prescriptions. A great deal of scholarship has been done to disprove these results, 
yet they were confirmed again utilizing updated data that included observations up to 
1986 (Sapsford et. al., 1992). 
This does not mean, however, that this phenomenon is a predetermined outcome. 
When extractive industries in developing states become captured and held hostage to 
political interests, more efficient firms can be crowded out along with many of the other 
problems listed above. Countries like Botswana, Chile, Malaysia, and Indonesia seem to 
have been able to develop policies toward these industries that have kept them 
competitive and effectively mitigated some of the problems that can occur with enclave 
economies (Auty, 2006). These policies include reinvesting the earnings on natural 
resource exports into light industry or manufacturing, educational services, and health 
services. A more diversified economy, along with more educated and healthier workers, 
has obvious benefits for an economy. 
Hammond (2011) found evidence that government policy vis-a-vis the extractive 
industry, in this case oil, may have a critical impact on future development. Hammond 
compares Angola and Venezuela to demonstrate his thesis. Angola's resources were 
opened up to foreign capital. A lack of state capacity and civil strife lead to a situation 
where rent seeking proliferated. Politicians relied on bribery to retain a privileged 
position in society. Well aware of the wealth of their country and the crushing poverty, 
the citizens of Angola took up arms to try and change the political climate. A three party 
civil war developed along with a succession movement in the oil rich region of 
Cambinda. Venezuela under Hugo Chavez, however, has a nationalized extraction 
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industry (PdVSA) that is exposed to market pressure, which keeps it lean. Venezuela is 
then able to take its foreign exchange earnings from oil and redistribute the wealth, invest 
in other sectors of the economy, invest in education, or invest in health services4. This has 
resulted in a reduction in the poverty level in the country, which in turn creates a larger 
domestic market for producers to sell goods in. What can be said, in general, is that a 
wide body of scholarship has demonstrated that resource rich states have demonstrated 
lower growth rates since the end of colonialism. 
 
Natural Resources and Corruption 
As mentioned above, corruption is another important aspect of resource curse 
theory. As the guarantor of property rights, states can be said to control access to the 
natural resources within its territorial boundaries. The legal mechanisms to control access 
to these resources, according to resource curse theory, are frequently undermined. This 
can happen through a variety of mechanisms. First, bureaucrats could be tempted for 
various reasons to accept a bribe to circumvent legal procedures. Second, firms may pay 
bribes to secure privileged access to resources. Bureaucracies in many mineral rich 
developing countries use rents to pay for access to these resources. Research has shown 
that these bureaucracies lack accountability and transparency because of the reliance on 
external funding. This reliance on outside money can also lead to policy positions 
contrary to the welfare of the country as a whole but beneficial to individuals associated 
with the bureaucracy. Furthermore, accurately recording revenue and enforcing laws 
                                                 
4 Specifically, Chavez created social programs called Missions that were funded by PdVSA earnings 
(Daguerre, 2011). 
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requires state capacity and strong institutions, which developing countries tend to lack. 
This as a whole can lead to the formation of a rentier state or a state that utilizes 
government revenue in a manner that does not benefit society.  
A key question emerges at this juncture. Is the lack of institutional capacity at the 
initial stages of resource extraction a cause or an effect of corruption? The resource curse 
theory focuses exclusively on developing countries. In the modern context, firms from 
developed countries are typically involved in extracting resources from developing 
countries. Developing countries are generally capital poor and have to import machinery 
and expertise to make effective use of their resources. Therefore, extraction generally 
begins before mechanisms are in place to guard against corruption. In an environment 
with limited capacity to monitor or regulate, the clientelistic relationships at the base of 
corrupt networks can develop. Therefore, a lack of institutional capacity at the initial 
stages of extraction can be an initial cause of corruption. Over time, however, corruption 
can impact the development of the institutions required to reduce corruption. The 
institutional capacity then becomes an effect of corruption.    
With regard to mineral wealth, Matti (2010) provides a case study of how 
corruption begins and continues to occur in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
(DRC). Extremely underdeveloped, the DRC is reliant on foreign firms to extract its vast 
mineral wealth. It has very poor if nonexistent institutions. Multinational firms can offer 
bribes, at a relatively low cost, that politicians are willing to accept to gain access to these 
resources. Enclave economies develop around the mines with little to no spillover effect 
into the broader economy. In this manner, the DRC is cursed by its resource wealth.  
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Shaxson (2007) examines a similar process with regard to oil wealth in Sub-
Saharan Africa. He finds that all oil producing states in Sub-Saharan Africa have below 
average government effectiveness as measured by Kaufmann’s Government 
Effectiveness Index and are at the bottom of Transparency International’s Corruption 
Perceptions Index. He finds that scholarship on the subject is limited in two ways. First, it 
does not consider the systemic nature of the resource curse, i.e. the relationship between 
developed and developing countries. Second, scholarship on this topic ignores cross 
border corruption. Overall, Shaxson finds that governance matters most. Resource 
endowments can be a necessary but not sufficient factor in perceptions of corruption. 
 Other scholarship has attempted to provide tests of the resource curse theory. 
Leite and Weidmann (1999) find a strong, negative correlation between the International 
Country Risk Guide corruption index and the share of fuel and ore exports as a 
percentage of gross national product while controlling for rule of law, revolutions and 
coups, and trade openness. In this corruption index a lower score means more corruption. 
Utilizing data from eighty eight countries, Gylfason (2001) plots the percentage of the 
labor force in the extractive sector with Transparency International's Corruption 
Perceptions Index and finds a strong and negative correlation between the two variables. 
The larger the percentage of the labor force in the extractive sector, the lower the rating in 
the Corruption Perceptions Index. In this index, a higher score means less corruption. 
Fjelde (2009) utilized panel data from 123 countries from 1985 to 1999 and finds that oil 
wealth is associated with higher corruption. In this study, Fjelde operationalized oil 
wealth and oil production per capita and made use of the International Country Risk 
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Guide to operationalize corruption.  
Arezki and Brückner (2011) utilize panel data from thirty oil producing states 
from 1992 to 2005 and find that the effect of oil rents on corruption depends on the 
state’s involvement in the oil sector. States with high state participation faced higher 
corruption while the effect was ambiguous in states with low amounts of state 
participation in the oil economy. These scholars utilized Political Risk Services to 
measure corruption and measured oil wealth as the amount of rents available (obtained 
from the International Monetary Fund). Lastly, Askari, Rehman and Afraa (2012) find 
that Islamic, oil exporting states have lower levels of corruption than states with similar 
regimes that are non-Islamic, oil exporting states. The effect of culture on corruption can 
be ambiguous. Rather, corruption is linked to poor business environments and weak 
mechanisms for good governance. Overall, many of these studies do indeed find that a 
resource curse exists with respect to oil. What about other natural resources? Does this 
relationship hold for other sources of resource wealth or is the resource curse just an oil 
curse? 
There is some literature that casts doubt on the relationship between natural 
resources and corruption. Utilizing data from the Corruption Perception Index from 1980-
1985 and 1996, Di John (2011) finds that non-mineral abundant developing countries are 
more corrupt than mineral-abundant countries. The perception of corruption in mineral-
abundant countries has more to do with the nature of the state and politics as well as the 
structure of ownership in the export sector. If citizens view the industries as being foreign 
owned or owned by a certain ethnic group, they are likely to describe the business 
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environment as corrupt. These sentiments were recently expressed in Bolivia during the 
events known as the “Gas War” (Kohl and Farthing, 2006). Perceptions or corruption are 
lower if the firms are seen to be benefiting the citizenry. 
 While there is some contention in the literature, there seems to be a broad 
theoretical basis and enough empirical research to support a relationship between 
resource rents and corruption. While there appears to be gaps in the literature in terms of 
disaggregated resource rents and the incorporation of many determinants of corruption as 
identified by the literature, it is appropriate at this time to build a formal model linking 
resource rents and corruption. 
 
A Model of Corruption in the Extractive Sector 
In the case of the extractive industry, corruption specifically means the collection 
of bribes for the issuing of permits and licenses, allowing goods to pass through customs 
or creating barriers to entry for competitors. This type of corrupt behavior may be called 
rent-seeking behavior. In economic terms, this behavior is undertaken for two reasons; 
suppliers of corruption want income, and demanders of corruption wish to avoid the 
rigors of market competition (Lambsdorff, 2007:113-117). This definition can be placed 
within a political-economic theoretical perspective. In doing so, this study may analyze 
the incentive structures that give rise to corrupt behavior. Having a large natural resource 
endowment can alter the incentive structure of bureaucrats and politicians which creates 
the potential for increased corruption. 
As noted previously, corruption is the outcome associated with rent-seeking and 
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aversion to market competition. On the supply side, bureaucrats and politicians will seek 
to maximize their utility by extracting rents from already existing sources. In this case, 
the existing source is natural resource wealth. These politicians will take advantage of 
their monopoly on regulation to extract favorable outcomes. On the demand side, firms 
will seek to avoid as much market pressure as possible and maintain high profits. This 
means bribing officials to gain or retain access to natural resources and blocking the entry 
of new firms into the market. 
 The structure of a given market also has an impact in this model. Shafer (1994:23) 
identifies two key aspects of a given sector's organization that influence leverage vis-à-
vis a state: capital intensity and the extent of economies of scale. Sectors that have high 
capital intensity and benefit from economies of scale will have more leverage in terms of 
capacity vis-a-vis a given governmental body in a developing state. This results primarily 
from the resulting market structure, namely monopolistic competition or oligopoly. Under 
these structural conditions, it is much easier for firms to form producer’s associations 
than in situations where there is low capital intensity and no benefit from economies of 
scale because the latter will tend to produce more firms. Firms in this resulting 
“high/high” pairing of capital intensity and economies of scale can have more of an 
influence on the functioning of the state, whether through lobbying or bribery. This study 
assumes that it is more efficient, in terms of cost and outcomes, for a firm to bribe a 
bureaucrat or politician than to use official channels of lobbying. 
 As a “high/high” industry, the extractive sector is very sensitive to state policy. 
Frieden (1991) provides us with an analytical tool to utilize to determine whether or not 
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an industry is sensitive to state policy. Firms, being profit maximizers, will utilize any 
leverage they have to maintain profitability. The degree to which they will use this 
leverage is a function of how vulnerable the firm's holdings are to state policy. The more 
susceptible a firm is, the higher the incentive to try to influence political outcomes. 
Industries that are characterized by economies of scales, sunk costs, reputational costs, 
and barriers to entry will be more sensitive to government policy (1991:20-21). This 
should stand to reason. If a firm must invest in large, capital intensive factories to be 
profitable, it will be unable, once the factory is built, to just close shop and relocate. It 
will be too expensive to do so. Asset specificity is also an important aspect of a sector to 
analyze. If a firm can easily shift its capital from one form of production to another, it 
will do so if faced by the proper incentive structure. Firms with completely fluid assets, 
like financial firms, can just move money around, forever chasing the highest return. 
Firms with completely specific assets must remain within the same industry. The 
extractive industry can clearly be said to meet the requirements of an industry in which 
firms are sensitive to government policy. Extractive firms have large sunk costs and 
benefit from economies of scale. The labor is very capital intensive. There are also high 
barriers to entry. Finally, the assets associated with resource extraction can be said to be 
specific. 
 Bringing all of this together, it becomes easy to see how, theoretically, one might 
expect countries that are reliant on natural resources to be more corrupt. Natural resource 
endowments are on a continuum. Some states have rich resource endowments, while 
others have few resource endowments. This creates a scarcity in terms of where a firm 
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may engage in extraction. Politicians are fully aware of this and attempt to gain the 
maximum benefit from their resource endowments. Because developing countries rarely 
have the capital necessary to extract the minerals themselves, they must look to foreign 
firms. This makes them reliant on exogenous sources of funding, undermining 
accountability to their polity. Being risk averse, these politicians would rather rely upon 
already existing sources of rent-seeking rather than create new sources. These rent-
seeking opportunities could involve the allocation of permits, for example. Thus, they 
will strive to ensure that the mining industry functions. This summarizes the supply side 
of corruption. 
 On the demand side of corruption, extraction firms are very sensitive to 
government policy. Having already invested heavily in exploration and the building of a 
large capital stock, mining firms will utilize all means available to keep profit margins 
high. Firms are thus faced with a choice. They must seek to influence policy through 
legally sanctioned channels or through corruption. In developing countries, corruption is 
likely the more efficient choice in terms of time, money and likelihood of success. 
Corruption in this regard could include paying bribes to regulators that might enforce 
environmental standards or to accountants trying to tax the revenue of a firm.  
 One last note needs to be made about the theoretical model. A country that has a 
large extractive sector but also has the means to finish and manufacture the resources 
should not suffer from resource curse theory like a state that does not. Being able to 
manufacture these commodities into goods is a sign of a more diversified and advanced 
economy. Resource curse theory tends to apply to countries that are just beginning to 
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develop. Furthermore the more reliant a country is on the extractive sector, the higher the 
incentive to engage in corrupt practices. Therefore it is important to look at the amount of 
rents available in a given extractive sector as a percentage of gross domestic product 
rather than the volume of rents available. For the sake of completeness, it will also be 
important to look at the percentage of resource exports as a percentage of total exports. 
This will help identify differences in states that export large amounts of low rent 
resources and states that export high rent resources. 
 
Conclusion 
 This chapter builds upon the previous chapters of this study by building a 
theoretical bridge between natural resource rents and corruption. Many questions remain 
about the systemic relationship between the resource rents and corruption, however. 
Namely, is there a difference in how different natural resource rents affect perceptions of 
corruption? If there is a difference, what can explain it? In the following chapters, 
statistical models will be built to test the relationship between resource rents and 
corruption. The methodology of the study and the methods of obtain data will be covered. 
The results of the models and the inferences to be drawn from them will follow. 
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Chapter Five 
Methodology and Data 
Dependent Variable 
 To fully examine the relationship between resource endowments and corruption, 
this paper constructs a cross sectional time series for all countries measured by 
Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (2012) from 1994-2012. 
Beginning in 1995, Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) has 
utilized survey data to rate countries on how pervasive corruption is within the country. 
Johnston (2001) identifies the CPI as the most widely used and the most ambitious effort 
to measure and compare perceived levels of corruption (160). Specifically, Johnston 
notes that the CPI is both reliable in terms of the standard deviation of the scores and 
valid in terms of being related statistically with other measures of perceptions of 
corruption (161, 164-165). This does not mean that the measure is without fault. In terms 
of precision, it is difficult to evaluate whether the variation across all values are 
consistent or not. Furthermore, the CPI does not accurately reflect contrasts in the types 
of corruption (162-164). Husted (1999) identifies another potential problem with the CPI. 
The measures reflect the opinions of outsiders that work for business, nongovernmental 
organizations, or intergovernmental organizations. They do not measure the opinions of 
people within the given society. Also, the CPI measures corruption that occurs between 
outsiders and state agents, not corruption that occurs within a state (347). These issues 
aside, the measure is the best available for researchers and is widely used in many 
academic studies, thus, this study uses the CPI as the measure for the dependent variable. 
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 Before moving on to the independent variables, it is important to analyze the way 
the CPI is constructed. Currently, the CPI draws upon data from thirteen different sources 
to create the composite index. Each source will be briefly covered by examining the 
instruments utilized to collect data. The first source used by the CPI is the African 
Development Bank’s Governance Ratings (African Development Bank Group, 2012). 
These ratings assess the transparency, accountability, and corruption in the public sector 
in 53 African states. Specifically, they measure the accountability of the executive to 
oversight institutions and of public employees for their performance, access of civil 
society to information on public affairs, and state capture by narrow vested interests. The 
second source used by the CPI is the Bertelsmann Foundation Sustainable Governance 
Indicators (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2011). This source focuses on 31 OECD states. This 
measure assesses the extent to which public officeholders as prevented from abusing their 
position for private interests. The third source used by the CPI is the Bertelsmann 
Foundation Transformation Index (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2013). Scoring 128 states and 
territories, this index focuses on two main questions. First, the study asks to what extent 
are public officeholders who abuse their positions prosecuted or penalized. Second, the 
study asks to what extent does the government successfully contain corruption. 
The fourth source used by the CPI is the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) 
Country Risk Ratings (The Economist Group, 2013). The EIU was established in 1946 as 
the research body for The Economist. Containing 144 states and territories, this data 
source rates states and territories based on the following eight criteria: 
1. Are there clear procedures and accountability governing the allocation and use 
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of public funds? 
2. Are public funds misappropriated by ministers/public officials for private or 
party political purposes? 
3. Are there special funds for which there is no accountability? 
4. Are there general abuses of public resources? 
5. Is there a professional civil service or are large numbers of officials directly 
appointed by the government? 
6. Is there an independent body auditing the management of public finances? 
7. Is there an independent judiciary with the power to try ministers/public 
officials for abuses? 
8. Is there a tradition of a payment of bribes to secure contracts and gain favors? 
Combined, these questions help to capture many different aspects of corruption within a 
state. 
 The fifth source used by the CPI is the Freedom House Nations in Transit data set 
(Freedom House, 2012). These data focus on 29 states throughout Central Europe and 
several newly independent states. Specifically, six dimensions are examined by this data 
set: 
1. Has the government implemented effective anti-corruption initiatives? 
2. Is the government free from excessive bureaucratic regulations, registration 
requirements, and other controls that increase opportunities for corruption? 
3. Are there adequate laws requiring financial disclosure and disallowing conflict 
of interest? 
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4. Does the government advertise jobs and contracts? 
5. Does the state enforce an effective legislative or administrative process – 
particularly one that is free of prejudice against one’s political opponents – to 
prevent, investigate, and prosecute the corruption of government officials and 
civil servants? 
6. Do whistleblowers, anti-corruption activists, investigators, and journalists 
enjoy legal protections that make them feel secure about reporting cases of 
bribery and corruption? 
Similar to the EIU, these data present a robust system for analyzing the prevalence of 
corruption that exists within a given state. 
 The sixth source used by the CPI is the Global Insight Country Risk Ratings (GI) 
(IHS, 2013). Founded in 1959, the GI provides a six factor analysis of the risk 
environment in 204 states and territories. With respect to corruption, GI focuses on the 
manner in which corruption affects the operational activities for businesses. Specifically, 
GI is interested in obtaining business permits, the policy environment, and planning 
decisions. The seventh source used by the CPI is the IMD World Competitiveness Year 
Book (International Institute for Management Development, 2013). Scoring 59 states, 
respondents were asked whether or not bribing and corruption exists within a state. The 
eighth source used by the CPI is the Political and Economic Risk Consultancy (Political 
and Economic Risk Consultancy, Ltd., 2013). This firm specializes in strategic business 
information and analysis for companies doing business in 15 countries in East and 
Southeast Asia. To provide sound information to clients, this firm analyzes corruption 
49 
 
along two dimensions. The first dimension of the study is the extent to which corruption 
is perceived to be a problem in the following positions: national-level political leaders, 
city and other local-level political leaders, civil servants at the national level, and civil 
servants at the city level. The second dimension of the study is the extent to which 
corruption is perceived to be a problem affecting the following institutions: the police 
department, the court system, customs, the taxation bureau, government licensing bodies, 
inspections bodies, and the military. 
 The ninth source used by the CPI is the Political Risk Services International 
Country Risk Guide (The PRS Group, 2013). This research monitors 140 states and asks 
survey respondents to rate the prevalence of actual or potential corruption with respect to 
excessive patronage, nepotism, job reservations, exchange of favors, secret party funding, 
and suspiciously close ties between politics and business. The tenth source used by the 
CPI is the Transparency International Bribe Payers Survey (Transparency International, 
2013). This survey measures the degree to which public officials demand or accept bribes 
and the degree to which public funds are misused for private gain. Business executives 
from 30 countries are surveyed and interviewed in the creation of this data. The World 
Bank Country Policy and Institutional Assessment serves as the eleventh source utilized 
in the creation of the CPI (The World Bank Group, 2012). This assessment measures 
transparency, accountability, and corruption in the public sector for 78 IDA-eligible 
states. The World Economic Forum Executive Opinion Survey serves as the twelfth 
source used by the CPI (World Economic Forum, 2013). This survey measures the 
frequency in which firms must make undocumented extra payments or bribes for the 
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following services: imports and exports, public utilities, annual tax payments, awarding 
of public contracts and licensing, and obtaining favorable judicial decisions. The subjects 
of this survey are business executives, with nearly 100 executives surveyed per each of 
the 140 economies sampled. The last source used by the CPI is the World Justice Project 
Rule of Law Index.  Containing expert responses from 97 states, this index measures the 
extent to which public officials use public office for private gain in the following sectors: 
the executive branch, the judicial branch, the police and the military, and the legislature. 
 The Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) uses the 
results from these previous thirteen sources and combines them to create a composite 
score that ranges from zero to ten. A zero represents a perfectly corrupt state. A ten 
represents a perfectly clean state. This is the most comprehensive measure for corruption 
found in the literature and is widely used in many empirical studies. The result of the 
composite score is a string variable that allows this study to utilize an ordinary least 
squares regression model. 
 
Independent Variables 
The first set of explanatory variables in this study represents a measure of the 
amount of resource rents, the difference between the cost of production and the sale price, 
earned as a percentage of gross domestic product. These rent measures are expressed as a 
percentage of GDP. The first rent measure captures the total amount of resource rents 
extracted in a given economy. These data are then disaggregated into five components: 
coal rents, forest rents, mineral rents, natural gas rents, and oil rents. The second set of 
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explanatory variables captures the amount of fuel exports as a percentage of total 
merchandise exports and the amount ores and metals exports as a percentage of total 
merchandise exports. This data is obtained from the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators (2012). 
   The next set of variables are control variables for covariates identified in the 
literature as determinants of corruption. The first set of controls relate to democracy and 
regime durability. The measure of democracy and the measure for regime durability 
comes from the Polity VI Project (Marshall and Jaggers, 2012). The democracy measure 
captures institutional features and places states on a scale from -10 to 10 with -10 being 
the most authoritarian and 10 being the most democratic. This paper uses the Polity2 
measure as it is more amendable to time series analysis. Regime durability is a count 
variable that counts the number of years a regime has been in place.  
The overall level of economic development is an important determinant of 
corruption. Gross domestic product is the standard measure of development. The natural 
logarithm of GDPPC will be used to fit the observations in a linear model. A larger share 
of government consumption may also create increased opportunities for rent seeking. To 
capture this, this study will utilize the measure for government consumption spending as 
a percentage of total consumption spending. A larger population is associated with a 
higher degree of corruption due to increased demand of scares government resources. The 
logarithm of population will be used to fit the observations to a linear model. Lastly, 
openness, measured as imports and exports over GDPPC, has been identified as being 
associated with less corruption. If corruption is treated like a cost to operating then prices 
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will be affected. A market that is opened up to international trade must have competitive 
prices or be put out of business. Therefore, openness should decrease corruption. The 
measures for GDPPC, government consumption, population, and openness are all 
obtained from the Penn World Table Verson 7.1 (Heston, et. al., 2012). Lastly, ethno 
linguistic fractionalization has been identified as having a positive relationship with 
corruption. 
This study uses a primarily political-economic model to predict perceptions of 
corruption. However, certain socio cultural characteristics can inform micro-level 
decision making. The first characteristic to be incorporated is ethno linguistic 
fractionalization. The measure for ethno linguistic fractionalization was obtained from 
Alesina, et. al. (2003). This measure captures the probability that two individuals selected 
at random from a country would be from a different ethno linguistic group. This data was 
taken from a 2003 study; however the values are slowly changing and will not vary much 
over time. Therefore these values were assigned to the entire country during the period of 
the study. Previous studies have linked ethno linguistic fractionalization to higher levels 
of corruption, so this study incorporates this measure. 
Certain regional dummies were also incorporated into model to attempt to capture 
aspects of regional regime characteristics. This study identified four particular regions of 
the international system of interest: Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Latin America and 
the Caribbean, the Middle East and North Africa, and Sub-Saharan Africa.5 Eastern 
Europe and Central Asia underwent a rapid transition from state socialism to capitalism 
following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Nearly 50,000 medium-scale and large-scale 
                                                 
5 See appendix for breakdown of regions. 
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enterprises were privatized during the first few years of this transition (Kaufmann and 
Siegelbaum, 1997). This created a unique opportunity through which wide spread graft 
and corruption could occur. In Latin America and the Caribbean, neopopulism has been 
identified as a factor that influences corruption. Neopopulist leaders typically seek to 
bypass established political parties and make direct appeals to the people. These direct 
appeals are typically broadcast through television, making neopopulism a costly method 
of attracting votes. This can increase the incentive to engage in corruption (Weyland, 
1998). In the Middle East and North Africa, sultanistic modes of rule, in which the 
distinction between the state and the regimes becomes blurred, allow for increased 
opportunities for corruption to occur. This is due to the amount of discretionary power 
these rulers have and the narrow social base that supports the regime (Lucas, 2004). 
Similar to sultanistic regimes, in the neopatrimonial regimes common to sub-Saharan 
Africa the state emerged “as an extension of the ruler’s household” (Leiken, 1996:64). 
Therefore, patronage, ethnic ties, kinship ties, and bribes became the major methods of 
governance. These regional dummy variables will help to capture these unique 
characteristics that undoubtedly shape the micro-level decision making of actors. 
 
Statistical Methodology 
As noted previously, the data is arranged into a cross sectional time series. The 
descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent variables can be found in Table 
A1. Pooled data are prone to heteroskedasticity. Therefore, the model is estimated with 
ordinary least squares regression and panel corrected standard errors (Beck and Katz, 
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1995).  The panels are unbalanced, so it will be necessary to use pairing to determine the 
variance. A Prais-Winsten regression revealed a very high rho (above 0.75), which 
demonstrates auto correlation in the data set. To account for this, it was necessary to 
estimate the model with a lagged dependent variable as an independent variable in the 
model (Beck and Katz, 1996). Doing so dramatically increased the R-squared of the 
model but significantly decreased the auto correlation in the dependent variable (the 
Prais-Winsten rho dropped to 0.03). This suggests that estimation of the model with the 
lagged dependent variable successfully controlled for serial correlation in the data set. 
To assess multicollinearity, a variance inflation factor test was used as well. The 
scores ranged from 2.59 to 1.25 with a mean VIF for the entire model of 1.61. The VIF 
scores are well within tolerance. Summed residuals of all the models were analyzed to 
check for unit effects that may be exhibiting a strong effect in the model. None of the 
summed residuals were more than five times the mean of the dependent variable, which 
suggests it was necessary to model fixed effects. To account for endogeneity, all 
independent variables were time lagged one year. Finally, the resource curse is said to 
impact developing states, therefore this model will only be looking at states that are not 
members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Asia 
is omitted as the reference category because the theoretical literature did not offer a clear 
hypothesis about states and corruption in this region.  
 
Hypotheses 
 With the methodology of the statistical model covered, it is now appropriate to 
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introduce the hypotheses to be tested in this study. As the reviews of the various 
literatures have shown, a clear theoretical link can be made between corruption and 
natural resource abundance. Yet there are gaps in the literature. Many studies did not test 
for the relative reliance of an economy on resource rents. This study will do so using 
measures of resource rents. Specifically, theory would predict that the more capital 
intensive and scarce a resource, the higher the probably of corruption to occur. In terms 
of exports, fuel exports, due to capital intensity and scarcity, should be associated with 
higher levels of corruption for similar reasons as non-renewable rents. 
 
 Hypothesis One: Capital intensive and non-renewable natural resource 
endowments should demonstrate a positive association with perceptions of corruption. 
 
 Hypothesis Two: A greater reliance on fuel exports relative to total exports should 
be associated with higher levels of corruption. 
 
 Different institutional features of a state have been shown in various studies to 
have differing influences on the pervasiveness of corruption. Namely, democracy has 
been shown to be able to help curb corruption. Furthermore, the stability of a regime 
could influence the ability of actors in an environment to be able to predict future 
interactions. The nature of the stability is a function of the type of regime. Because of 
this, an interaction variable will be used, multiplying the polity score with regime 
durability. A durable democracy should have less corruption, whereas a durable 
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authoritarian regime should have more corruption.  
 
 Hypothesis Three: Higher levels of democracy should be associated with lower 
levels of corruption. 
 
 Hypothesis Four: The interaction variable of democracy and regime durability, 
with higher scores being related to long standing democracies and lower scores being 
associated with long standing autocracies, should have a negative effect on corruption. 
 
 Economic influences should also demonstrate an effect on corruption. First, 
openness, an indirect manner of judging the exposure of an economy to the international 
price mechanism, should put pressure on corrupt states through competition. Therefore, 
openness should be associated with lower levels of corruption. A greater pool of 
resources to distribute through patronage a graft can change the incentive to engage in 
corruption. Therefore, a larger amount of government consumption spending relative to 
total consumption spending could be associated with higher levels of corruption. Lastly, 
higher levels of gross domestic product per capita alter the incentive structure by 
changing the opportunity cost. A higher wage level should, therefore, be associated with 
lower levels of corruption. 
 
 Hypothesis Five: Higher levels of openness should be associated with lower levels 
of corruption. 
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 Hypothesis Six: Higher levels of government consumption spending as a 
percentage of total consumption spending should be associated with higher levels of 
corruption. 
 
 Hypothesis Seven: A higher gross domestic product per capita should be 
associated with lowers levels of corruption. 
 
 The last set of hypotheses are related as socio-cultural influences. First, ethno-
linguistic fractionalization can lead to favoritism and patronage on behalf of one’s group. 
Therefore, higher levels of ethno-linguistic fractionalization should be associated with 
higher levels of corruption. A larger population increases the competition for state 
resources. A higher level of scarcity increases the demand on goods and services. This 
changes the incentive structure to engage in corruption by altering the opportunity cost. 
Lastly, regional variables have been included to try to capture shared societal norms and 
common historical experiences. 
 
 Hypothesis Eight: A higher level of ethno linguistic fractionalization should be 
associated with higher levels of corruption. 
 
 Hypothesis Nine: A larger population should be associated with higher levels of 
corruption. 
 
58 
 
Hypothesis Ten: States located in Central Asia should have higher levels of 
corruption due to the transition from state socialism to market capitalism. 
 
 Hypothesis Eleven: States located in Eastern and South Eastern Europe should 
have higher levels of corruption due to the transition from state socialism to market 
capitalism. 
 
 Hypothesis Twelve: States located in Latin America and the Caribbean should 
have higher levels of corruption due to the region’s common history with neopopulist 
modes of rule. 
 
 Hypothesis Thirteen: States located in Northern Africa and the Middle East should 
have higher levels of corruption due to the region’s common history with sultanistic 
modes of rule. 
  
Hypothesis Fourteen: States located in Sub-Saharan Africa should have higher 
levels of corruption due to the region’s common history with neo-patrimonial modes of 
rule. 
 
To test these hypotheses, the following equation will be used to estimate levels of 
perceived corruption: 
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Perceived Corruption = B1*Perceived Corruptiont-1 + B2*Resource Rent/Exportt-1 + 
B3*Polity2t-1 + B4*Regime Durabilityt-1 + B5*(Polity2t-1*Regime Durabilityt-1) + 
B6*Government Consumptiont-1 + B7*Trade Opennesst-1 + B8*Ethno linguistic 
fractionalization + B9*Logarithm of Populationt-1 + B10*Logarithm of GDPPCt-1 + 
B11*Central Asia + B12*Eastern and Southeastern Europe + B13*Latin America and the 
Caribbean + B14*Middle East and North Africa + B15*Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
Conclusion 
 This study has attempted to utilize the best common practices in statistical 
modeling to test the above hypotheses. Special attention was paid to the different measure 
to try and capture the desired variables in the best manner possible. Based upon the 
model outlined in Chapter Four, this study anticipates that capital intensive and non-
renewable resources, due to asset specificity and relative scarcity, will have more of an 
effect on corruption than non-capital intensive, recyclable, or renewable resources. This 
study also anticipates that micro-level measures that shape the incentive structure of 
engaging in corrupt behavior will have more of an influence on the aggregate level of 
perceived corruption than structural measures. The next chapter will provide a detailed 
discussion of the various statistical regressions utilized to test these hypotheses. 
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Chapter Six 
Results and Analysis 
 In this chapter the results from eight regression models will be analyzed. Each 
model will be analyzed individually. After analyzing all eight models, generalizations 
will be made about possible systematic relationships across all models. 
Before discussing the substantive variables in each model, an important issue 
needs to be covered. As noted in Chapter Five, due to serial autocorrelation in dependent 
variable, this study estimated each model with a lagged dependent variable. The 
coefficient for the lagged dependent variable is significant in all eight models, and it 
accounts for a great degree of the variation in perceptions of corruption6. Even with this, 
some independent variables still demonstrate a significant and theoretically predicted 
relationship with the dependent variable. 
 
Resource Rents Models 
 The first model to be analyzed is the total rents model. In this model, total natural 
resource rents is the main independent variable of interest. It should be recalled here that 
with the Transparency International data for corruption higher values are associated with  
lower levels of perceived corruption. As anticipated by the resource curse theory, the 
coefficient for larger percentage of natural resource rents relative to gross domestic 
product is correlated with higher levels of perceived corruption. While an important 
                                                 
6 The standardized regression coefficient (beta) for the lagged DV has the following values in the eight 
regression models in the order that they appear: 0.921614, 0.9227602, 0.9385789, 0.9320781, 0.9322331, 
0.9149208, 0.9012009, 0.9190365. Adding the lagged dependent variable changes the adjusted R-squared 
of the models by an average of 0.3384. 
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Table 1: Total Rents Model7 
 Coef. Panel-
corrected Std. 
Err. 
z p<|z| 95% Conf. Interval 
Corruption  
Perception 
 
0.9112012*** 0.023178 39.31 0.000 0.8657731 0.9566293 
Total Rents 
 
 
-0.0025815*** 0.0007872 -3.28 0.001 -0.0041243 -0.0010387 
Polity2 
 
 
0.0064818** 0.0031452 2.06 0.039 0.0003174 0.0126462 
Regime Durability 
 
 
0.0007828 0.0008705 0.90 0.369 -0.0009234 0.0024889 
Polity*Durability 
 
 
-0.0001332 0.0000819 -1.63 0.104 -0.0002936 0.0000273 
Government 
Consumption 
 
0.002631 0.0016491 1.60 0.111 -0.0006011 0.005863 
Openness 
 
 
0.0005728** 0.0002887 1.98 0.047 6.92e-06 0.0011387 
Ethno linguistic 
Fractionalization 
 
-0.191477 0.041635 -0.46 0.646 -0.1007509 0.0624554 
Log of Population 
 
 
0.0013971 0.0101124 0.14 0.890 -0.184227 0.021217 
Log GDPPC 
Con 2005  
 
0.0903987*** 0.0253941 3.56 0.000 0.0406271 0.1401703 
Central Asia 
 
 
0.0418421 0.0564132 0.74 0.458 -0.0687258 0.1401703 
Eastern and 
Southeastern Europe 
 
-0.0242396 0.0491086 -0.49 0.622 -0.1204907 0.0720115 
Latin America and 
Caribbean 
 
-0.0657668 0.0507566 -1.30 0.195 -0.1652479 0.0337143 
Middle East and 
North Africa 
 
0.0205656 0.0408966 0.50 0.615 -0.0595902 0.1007214 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
 
0.0830359* 0.0457186 1.82 0.069 -0.0065708 0.1726426 
Constant -0.5491589** 0.2589804 -2.12 0.034 -1.056751 -0.0415667 
Adjusted R-squared 0.9470      
Wald chi-squared 139161.70      
Prob > chi-squared 0.0000      
Rho 0.0334422      
Observations 1276      
Groups 126      
*=p<0.1, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01 
 
 
                                                 
7 See Appendix for states included in the model. Asia and Pacific are the omitted reference categories. 
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lower levels of perceived corruption. As anticipated by the resource curse theory, the 
coefficient for larger percentage of natural resource rents relative to gross domestic 
product is correlated with higher levels of perceived corruption. While an important 
finding, this does not shed much light on the original hypothesis. To adequately test the 
original hypothesis, the disaggregated natural resource rent measure will need to be 
analyzed. 
 The covariates for institutional influences display mixed results in the total rents 
measures. The coefficient for the Polity measure of democracy performs as expected. 
Higher levels of democracy are associated with lower levels of perceived corruption. 
Regime durability does not show a significant relationship with levels of perceived 
corruption. The interaction term created from the measure for democracy and regime 
durability does not demonstrate a significant relationship with perceptions of corruption. 
 The next group of independent variables in the total rents model capture the effect 
of economic influences. The coefficients for two variables demonstrate a significant 
relationship with corruption. The first is openness. A higher degree of openness to trade is 
associated with lower levels of perceived corruption. The second variable that 
demonstrates a significant relationship with corruption is gross domestic product per 
capita. The coefficient for GDP per capita (logged) show that higher levels of average 
income are associated with lower levels of perceived corruption. The coefficient for 
government consumption spending as a percentage of total consumption spending is not 
significant 
 The final group of independent variables can be categorized as socio-cultural  
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variables. One regional dummy variable, sub-Saharan Africa demonstrates a significant 
relationship with perceptions of corruption. Compared to Asia, sub-Saharan African states 
are less likely to be corrupt. The coefficient for ethno linguistic fractionalization does not 
demonstrate a significant relationship with perceptions of corruption. The coefficient for 
population of a state is also insignificant.  
 The second model to be covered is the coal rents model (Table 2). The coefficient 
for coal rents demonstrates that a larger percentage of coal rents as a percentage of gross 
domestic product is associated with a higher level of perceived corruption. Theoretically, 
this is expected. Coal is a non-renewable natural resource, which increases scarcity. 
Furthermore, coal extraction and processing is capital intensive, which is also 
theoretically relevant in terms of asset specificity. 
 Compared to the total rents model, the coefficients for institutional variables 
demonstrate a different relationship with perceptions of corruption in the coal rents 
model. Like the total rents model, the coefficient for the Polity measure of democracy is 
positive and significant. The interaction term for level of democracy and regime 
durability also does not demonstrate a relationship with perceptions of corruption. 
Interestingly, the coefficient for regime durability does demonstrate a signification 
relationship with perceptions of corruption. Specifically, the older the regime, the lower 
the levels of perceived corruption. 
 The covariates for economic influence also behave in a different manner in the 
coal rents model. The coefficient for gross domestic product per capita is positive and 
significant. A higher income level is correlated with lower levels of perceived corruption. 
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Table 2: Coal Rents Model8 
 Coef. Panel-
corrected Std. 
Err. 
z p<|z| 95% Conf. Interval 
Corruption 
Perception 
 
0.8972682*** 0.0237945 37.71 0.000 0.8506319 0.9439045 
Coal Rents 
 
 
-0.0126043** 0.055658 -2.26 0.024 -0.0235132 -0.0016955 
Polity2 
 
 
0.0094266* 0.0052 1.81 0.070 -0.0007653 0.0196185 
Regime Durability 
 
 
0.0022458** 0.0009853 2.28 0.023 0.0003146 0.0041769 
Polity*Durability 
 
 
-0.0001938 0.0001297 -1.49 0.135 -0.0004479 0.0000603 
Government 
Consumption 
 
0.0044385 0.0032245 1.38 0.169 -0.0018814 0.0107583 
Openness 
 
 
-0.0000205 0.0006173 -0.03 0.973 -0.0012304 0.0011893 
Ethno linguistic 
Fractionalization 
 
-0.0249866 0.0823223 -0.30 0.761 -0.1863353 0.1363621 
Log of Population 
 
 
-0.0230916 0.0166388 -1.39 0.165 -0.055703 0.0095199 
Log GDPPC 
Con 2005  
 
0.0883388*** 0.0308159 2.87 0.004 0.279408 0.1487369 
Central Asia 
 
 
-0.0281618 0.0619841 -0.45 0.650 -0.1496484 0.0933248 
Eastern and 
Southeastern Europe 
 
-0.0721124 0.0571582 -1.26 0.207 -0.1841406 0.0399157 
Latin America and 
Caribbean 
 
-0.0989304 0.0723563 -1.37 0.172 -0.2407461 0.0428853 
Middle East and 
North Africa 
 
-0.037345 0.0659762 -0.57 0.571 -0.166656 0.091966 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
 
0.0249053 0.0518865 0.48 0.631 -0.0767904 0.1266009 
Constant -0.043021 0.2657054 -0.16 0.871 -0.5637941 0.4777521 
Adjusted R-squared 0.9471      
Wald chi-squared 36824.80      
Prob > chi-squared 0.0000      
Rho 0.0487814      
Observations 575      
Groups 51      
*=p<0.1, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01 
 
 
                                                 
8 See Appendix for states included in the model. Asia and Pacific are the omitted reference categories. 
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Openness, however, is not associated with perceptions of corruption in the coal rents 
model. This differs from the total rents model. Lastly, government consumption spending 
as a percentage of total consumption spending is not significantly associated with levels 
of perceived corruption. 
 None of the coefficients for socio-cultural variables are statistically significant in 
the coal rents model. The coefficients for ethno linguistic fractionalization, population, 
and the regional dummies are all insignificant. This suggests that the population size and 
region of states with coal rents are not related to perceptions of corruption. 
The forest rents model (Table 3) is the first statistical model that involves a 
renewable natural resource. Furthermore, compared to the other types of resource rents 
examined in this study, forest rents are the least capital intensive and the least capital 
specific. Therefore, the theoretical model developed in Chapter Five would lead one to 
expect that forest rents will not be associated with corruption. Not surprisingly, the results 
from regression model three show that the coefficient for forest rents is not significant. 
The measures of institutional influences perform in a manner comparable to the 
total rents model. The coefficient for Polity is once again positive, demonstrating that a 
higher degree of democracy is associated with lower levels of perceived corruption. The 
coefficients for regime durability and the interaction term of regime type and regime 
durability are not significant. 
Economic influences in the forest rents model also behave in a manner 
comparable to the total rents model. The coefficients for openness and gross domestic  
product per capita are both positive and significant, suggesting a positive relationship  
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Table 3: Forest Rents Model9 
 Coef. Panel-
corrected Std. 
Err. 
z p<|z| 95% Conf. Interval 
Corruption 
Perception 
 
0.9246258*** 0.0210227 43.98 0.000 0.883422 0.9658295 
Forest Rents 
 
 
0.0026211 0.0048422 0.54 0.588 -0.0068695 0.0121117 
Polity2 
 
 
0.0088453*** 0.003347 2.64 0.008 0.0022854 0.0154052 
Regime Durability 
 
 
0.0009233 0.0008766 1.05 0.292 -0.0007948 0.0026414 
Polity*Durability 
 
 
-0.0001026 0.000083 -1.24 0.216 -0.0002654 0.0000601 
Government 
Consumption 
 
0.0012074 0.0015094 0.80 0.424 -0.001751 0.0041658 
Openness 
 
 
0.000677** 0.0002958 2.29 0.022 0.0000972 0.0012568 
Ethno linguistic 
Fractionalization 
 
-0.0746594* 0.0430005 -1.74 0.083 -0.1589389 0.00962 
Log of Population 
 
 
0.0053826 0.0099921 0.54 0.590 -0.0142016 0.0249668 
Log GDPPC 
Con 2005  
 
0.0489687* 0.0250923 1.95 0.051 -0.0002112 0.0981486 
Central Asia 
 
 
0.0357307 0.0513743 0.70 0.487 -0.0649611 0.1364224 
Eastern and 
Southeastern Europe 
 
0.0153303 0.0507935 0.30 0.763 -0.0842231 0.1148838 
Latin America and 
Caribbean 
 
-0.045842 0.0530118 -0.86 0.387 -0.1497433 0.0580592 
Middle East and 
North Africa 
 
0.0090076 0.0430651 0.21 0.834 -0.0753984 0.0934136 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
 
0.0681194 0.0425639 1.60 0.110 -0.0153044 0.1515432 
Constant -0.3357232 0.2569984 -1.31 0.191 -0.8394308 0.1679844 
Adjusted R-squared 0.9450      
Wald chi-squared 499176.02      
Prob > chi-squared 0.0000      
Rho 0.0332701      
Observations 1254      
Groups 123      
*=p<0.1, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01 
 
 
                                                 
9 See Appendix for states included in the model. Asia and Pacific are the omitted reference categories. 
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with perceptions of corruption. The coefficient for government consumption spending as 
a percentage of total consumption spending is not significant. Finally, the coefficient for 
ethno linguistic fractionalization is negative and significant, as expected. 
 Table 4 presents the results for the mineral rents model. In terms of the theory, 
mineral extraction, processing, and smelting are definitely capital intensive. The 
difference is that minerals are not non-renewable. While there are diminishing returns to 
recycling, many different types of mineral resources are not consumed forever once they 
are smelted and finished. Theoretically, this means that purchasing recycled metals can be 
an alternative to buying extracted ore. This may reduce the leverage of those officials 
who seek to control mineral rich lands to extract bribes. Therefore, the relationship 
between mineral rents and corruption may not be that strong. The statistical results lend 
support to the theory. The coefficients for mineral rents is not significant. 
The effects of the institutional variables in the mineral rents model display the 
same pattern as the total rents model. Again, the coefficient for Polity is positive and 
significant, suggesting a higher level of democracy is associated with lower levels of 
perceived corruption. The coefficients for the other two institutional variables, regime 
durability and the regime type-regime durability interaction term are not significant. 
The mineral rents model does suggest that economic influences are potentially 
important to understanding corruption. A higher level of openness and gross domestic 
product per capita are associated with lower levels of perceived corruption, however  
government consumption as a percentage of GDP has no demonstrable effect on 
perceptions of corruption. None of the coefficients for the socio-cultural variables were  
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Table 4: Mineral Rents Model10 
 Coef. Panel-
corrected Std. 
Err. 
z p<|z| 95% Conf. Interval 
Corruption 
Perception 
 
0.9278682*** 0.0211536 43.86 0.000 0.886408 0.9693284 
Mineral Rents 
 
 
-0.0020306 0.0018669 -1.09 0.277 -0.0056896 0.0016284 
Polity2 
 
 
0.0084535** 0.0033541 2.52 0.012 0.0018796 0.0150273 
Regime Durability 
 
 
0.0007608 0.0008742 0.87 0.384 -0.0009526 0.0024741 
Polity*Durability 
 
 
-0.0001283 0.000083 -1.55 0.122 -0.000291 0.0000344 
Government 
Consumption 
 
0.0016724 0.0015753 1.06 0.288 -0.0014151 0.00476 
Openness 
 
 
0.0005323* 0.0002865 1.86 0.063 -0.0000292 0.0010939 
Ethno linguistic 
Fractionalization 
 
-0.0396114 0.0416355 -0.95 0.341 -0.1212155 0.0419927 
Log of Population 
 
 
0.0006435 0.0098992 0.07 0.948 -0.0187587 0.0200456 
Log GDPPC 
Con 2005  
 
0.05799*** 0.0207754 2.79 0.005 0.017271 0.0987089 
Central Asia 
 
 
-0.0010199 0.053715 -0.02 0.985 -0.1062994 0.1042596 
Eastern and 
Southeastern Europe 
 
-0.0101269 0.0492248 -0.21 0.837 -0.1066056 0.0863519 
Latin America and 
Caribbean 
 
-0.0653345 0.05143 -1.27 0.204 -0.1661353 0.0354664 
Middle East and 
North Africa 
 
0.007309 0.04096 0.18 0.858 -0.0729712 0.0875891 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
 
0.0528193 0.0408802 1.29 0.196 -0.0273045 0.1329431 
Constant -0.3240802 0.230544 -1.41 0.160 -0.7759381 0.1277778 
Adjusted R-squared 0.9462      
Wald chi-squared 1.16e+06      
Prob > chi-sqaured 0.0000      
Rho 0.0343497      
Observations 1276      
Groups 126      
*=p<0.1, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01 
 
 
                                                 
10 See Appendix for states included in the model. Asia and Pacific are the omitted reference categories. 
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significant in the mineral rents model. 
The remaining two natural resource rent models are both non-renewable. These 
models are presented in Tables 5 and 6. The first is the natural gas rents model. Like coal, 
natural gas is a non-renewable resource. This could give leverage to those in control of 
property rights to extract bribes. Furthermore, the extraction and refining of natural gas is 
capital intensive and the capital is largely asset specific. As a result, firms engaged in 
natural gas might be sensitive to policy and more likely to accede to demands for bribery. 
The results from the regression model show that the coefficient for natural gas rents are 
indeed negative and significant, suggesting that natural gas rents are associated with 
higher levels of perceived corruption. 
 Like many of the previous resource rent models, higher levels of democracy are 
again associated with lower levels of perceived democracy in the natural gas rents model. 
Again the regime durability and the interaction variable between regime type and regime 
durability are insignificant. 
 However, economic variables perform in a different manner than the total rents 
model. The coefficient for gross domestic product per capita is positive and significant, 
suggesting that higher levels of wealth per person is associated with less corruption.  
Unlike the total rents model, however, a higher degree of openness is not significantly 
related to lower levels of perceived corruption. Government consumption again fails to 
achieve statistical significance. Lastly, none of the socio-cultural variables are statistically 
significant. 
The final resource rent model is the oil rents model (Table 6). The theoretical  
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Table 5: Natural Gas Rents11 
 Coef. Panel-
corrected Std. 
Err. 
z p<|z| 95% Conf. Interval 
Corruption 
Perception 
 
0.9217238*** 0.0217521 42.37 0.000 0.8790905 0.9643572 
Natural Gas Rents 
 
 
-0.00166** 0.0007576 -2.19 0.028 -0.0031449 -0.0001751 
Polity2 
 
 
0.0071272** 0.0032881 2.17 0.030 0.0006827 0.0135717 
Regime Durability 
 
 
0.0005753 0.007875 0.73 0.465 -0.0009681 0.0021187 
Polity*Durability 
 
 
-0.0001164 0.0000848 -1.37 0.170 -0.0002826 0.0000499 
Government 
Consumption 
 
0.0023471 0.0020048 1.17 0.242 -0.0015822 0.0062765 
Openness 
 
 
0.00496 0.0003301 1.50 0.133 -0.000151 0.001143 
Ethno linguistic 
Fractionalization 
 
-0.0669748 0.0588305 -1.14 0.255 -0.1822804 0.0483309 
Log of Population 
 
 
-0.0034937 0.11148 -0.31 0.754 -0.0253433 0.0183559 
Log GDPPC 
Con 2005  
 
0.0742981*** 0.0214037 3.47 0.001 0.0323476 0.1162485 
Central Asia 
 
 
-0.0082627 0.0541625 -0.15 0.879 -0.1144192 0.0978938 
Eastern and 
Southeastern Europe 
 
-0.0376209 0.0442842 -0.85 0.396 -0.1244164 0.0491746 
Latin America and 
Caribbean 
 
-0.0821441 0.0510682 -1.61 0.108 -0.182236 0.0179478 
Middle East and 
North Africa 
 
-0.151465 0.0483307 -0.31 0.754 -0.109873 0.07958 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
 
0.0357208 0.0433535 0.82 0.410 -0.0492505 0.1206922 
Constant -0.3366698 0.2301312 -1.46 0.143 -0.7877187 0.1143791 
Adjusted R-squared 0.9494      
Wald chi-squared 89009.21      
Prob > chi-squared 0.0000      
Rho 0.039055      
Observations 1081      
Groups 97      
*=p<0.1, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01 
 
  
  
                                                 
11 See Appendix for states included in the model. Asia and Pacific are the omitted reference categories. 
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perspective behind the relationship between oil rents and levels of corruption is nearly 
identical to the natural gas model. The only difference is that the global economy is much 
more reliant on oil than natural gas. Therefore, the level of scarcity of oil compared to 
natural gas is much greater. The effect of oil rents on the level of perceived corruption 
should be greater than that of natural gas rents. The results of the regression model 
confirm this expectation. The coefficient for oil rents is negative and significant, 
suggesting the higher the level of oil rents, the higher the level of perceived corruption. 
 The institutional variables do not perform as expected in the oil rents model. The 
coefficient for Polity is significant and positive. The coefficient for the interaction term is 
significant but negative. This suggests that long standing democratic regimes are more 
likely to be corrupt than long standing autocratic regimes. This is an unexpected finding. 
A possible explanation is that long standing semi-democracies (ranging from a Polity2 
score of 1 to 5) could be driving this relationship. Additional research is necessary to 
fully understand this relationship. 
 There is continuity between the total rents model and the oil rents model in terms 
of the performance of economic variables. The coefficient for openness is significant and 
positive. The coefficient for gross domestic product per capita is statistically significant 
and is associated with lower levels of perceived corruption. Like the total rents model, the 
coefficient for government consumption is not significant, while the coefficients for the 
socio-cultural variables are also insignificant except of the regional dummy variable for 
sub-Saharan Africa. Again, states in sub-Saharan Africa are less likely to be corrupt than 
states in the omitted category (Asia Pacific). 
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Table 6: Oil Rents Model12 
 Coef. Panel-
corrected Std. 
Err. 
z p<|z| 95% Conf. Interval 
Corruption 
Perception 
 
0.9029485*** 0.025503 35.41 0.000 0.8529636 0.9529335 
Oil Rents 
 
 
-0.0041498*** 0.001498 -2.77 0.006 -0.0070858 -0.0012138 
Polity2 
 
 
0.0056815* 0.0032239 1.76 0.078 -0.0006373 0.0120003 
Regime Durability 
 
 
0.0008195 0.0007951 1.03 0.303 -0.0007388 0.0023779 
Polity*Durability 
 
 
-0.0001474* 0.0000847 -1.74 0.082 -0.0003135 0.0000186 
Government 
Consumption 
 
0.0025331 0.0016917 1.50 0.134 -0.0007826 0.0058489 
Openness 
 
 
0.0006006* 0.000331 1.81 0.070 -0.0000481 0.0012493 
Ethno linguistic 
Fractionalization 
 
-0.0341542 0.0585999 -0.58 0.560 -0.1490079 0.0806994 
Log of Population 
 
 
-0.0018229 0.0106256 -0.17 0.864 -0.0226487 0.019003 
Log GDPPC 
Con 2005  
 
0.1079842*** 0.0313314 3.45 0.001 0.0465757 0.1693927 
Central Asia 
 
 
-0.007537 0.0478116 -0.16 0.875 -0.1012489 0.086172 
Eastern and 
Southeastern Europe 
 
-0.0408432 0.0449231 -0.91 0.363 -0.1288908 0.0472045 
Latin America and 
Caribbean 
 
-0.0699765 0.0489702 -1.43 0.153 -0.1659563 0.0260033 
Middle East and 
North Africa 
 
0.0137178 0.0460956 0.30 0.766 -0.0766278 0.1040635 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
 
0.0877484* 0.0524387 1.67 0.094 
 
-0.0150296 0.1905264 
Constant -0.6040522** 0.2608393 -2.32 0.021 -1.115288 -0.0928166 
Adjusted R-squared 0.9501      
Wald chi-squared 193658.11      
Prob > chi-squared 0.0000      
Rho 0.04146      
Observations 1099      
Groups 100      
*=p<0.1, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01 
  
 
                                                 
12 See Appendix for states included in the model. Asia and Pacific are the omitted reference categories. 
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The previous six models utilized resource rents measures to operationalize a 
state’s reliance on natural resources for economic output. Another way to measure the 
reliance of a state on natural resource exports is to examine the export portfolio of a state.  
Two measures were available through the World Bank: fuel exports as a percentage of  
total merchandise exports and ores and metals exports as a percentage of total 
merchandise exports. These two measures were employed along with the covariates used 
in models 1 – 6. The results of these trials are presented in Tables 7 and 8. 
 The first export model captures the relationship fuel exports and corruption (Table 
7). In terms of the theoretical perspective of this study, fuel exports should behave in a 
similar manner as coal rents, natural gas rents, and oil rents. Fuel exports are inherently 
non-renewable. Furthermore, the extraction and processing of fuel exports require 
significant capital investments. Therefore, fuel exports should be associated with higher 
levels of perceived corruption. The results of the regression model confirm this 
relationship. As one can see in Table 7, the coefficient for fuel exports is negative and 
significant. 
 None of the institutional variables are significant. In this sense, the fuel export 
model behaves much like the oil rents model. The economic variables, however, perform 
much in the same way as they have in many of the other models. The coefficient for 
openness is close to the threshold of significance (p < 0.107). The coefficient for gross 
domestic product per capita is positive and significant. Again, this finding points to 
openness and higher levels of wealth per person being associated with lower levels of 
perceived corruption, ceteris paribus.  
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Table 7: Fuel Exports Model13 
 Coef. Panel-
corrected Std. 
Err. 
z p<|z| 95% Conf. Interval 
Corruption 
Perception 
 
0.8858579*** 0.0282579 31.35 0.000 0.8304735 0.9412423 
Fuel Exports 
 
 
-0.0022327*** 0.0007575 -2.95 0.003 -0.0037174 -0.0007479 
Polity2 
 
 
0.0031309 0.003537 0.89 0.376 -0.0038014 0.0100632 
Regime Durability 
 
 
0.0006648 0.0009017 0.74 0.461 -0.0011204 0.0024321 
Polity*Durability 
 
 
-0.0001071 0.00091 -1.18 0.239 -0.0002854 0.0000712 
Government 
Consumption 
 
0.0025889 0.0028477 0.91 0.363 -0.0029924 0.0081703 
Openness 
 
 
0.000549 0.000341 1.61 0.107 -0.0001194 0.0012174 
Ethno linguistic 
Fractionalization 
 
-0.0484594 0.051511 -0.94 0.347 -0.1494191 0.0525002 
Log of Population 
 
 
-0.0042453 0.0126754 -0.33 0.738 -0.0290886 0.0205979 
Log GDPPC 
Con 2005  
 
0.1313477*** 0.0394155 3.33 0.001 0.0540949 0.2086006 
Central Asia 
 
 
-0.0165389 0.0712227 -0.23 0.816 -0.1561328 0.123055 
Eastern and 
Southeastern Europe 
 
-0.0556053 0.0557899 -1.00 0.319 -0.1649515 0.0537409 
Latin America and 
Caribbean 
 
-0.091878 0.056232 -1.63 0.102 -0.2020907 0.0183347 
Middle East and 
North Africa 
 
-0.0002178 0.0529215 -0.00 0.997 -0.103942 0.1035064 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
 
0.1034502* 0.0568492 1.82 0.069 -0.0079722 -0.02148726 
Constant -0.6505405** 0.3264856 -1.99 0.046 -1.29044 -0.0106405 
Adjusted R-squared 0.9420      
Wald chi-squared 52675.20      
Prob > chi-squared 0.0000      
Rho 0.0458516      
Observations 1065      
Groups 108      
*=p<0.1, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01 
 
 
 
                                                 
13 See Appendix for states included in the model. Asia and Pacific are the omitted reference categories. 
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Table 8: Ore and Metals Exports Model14 
 Coef. Panel-
corrected Std. 
Err. 
z p<|z| 95% Conf. Interval 
Corruption 
Perception 
 
0.9067237*** 0.0250469 36.20 0.000 0.8576328 0.9558147 
Ores and Metals 
Exports 
 
0.0007633 0.0006638 1.15 0.250 -0.0005377 0.0020643 
Polity2 
 
 
0.0073445** 0.0035675 2.06 0.040 0.0003523 0.0143368 
Regime Durability 
 
 
0.0007579 0.0009296 0.82 0.415 -0.0010641 0.0025798 
Polity*Durability 
 
 
-0.0001129 0.0000909 -1.24 0.214 -0.0002911 0.0000653 
Government 
Consumption 
 
0.0037072 0.0026678 1.39 0.165 -0.0015216 0.0089359 
Openness 
 
 
0.0006366* 0.0003433 1.85 0.064 -0.0000362 0.0013093 
Ethno linguistic 
Fractionalization 
 
-0.0808438 0.0497719 -1.62 0.104 -0.1783949 0.0167072 
Log of Population 
 
 
-0.004903 0.0118304 -0.41 0.679 -0.0280902 0.0182842 
Log GDPPC 
Con 2005  
 
0.0857653*** 0.0305397 2.81 0.005 0.0259086 0.1456219 
Central Asia 
 
 
-0.0384888 0.0704671 -0.55 0.585 -0.01766017 0.0996241 
Eastern and 
Southeastern Europe 
 
-0.0442199 0.0550573 -0.80 0.422 -0.1521302 0.0636904 
Latin America and 
Caribbean 
 
-0.099223* 0.0557589 -1.78 0.075 -0.2085085 0.0100625 
Middle East and 
North Africa 
 
-0.0120944 0.050516 -0.24 0.811 -0.111104 0.0869152 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
 
0.0666345 0.0469404 1.42 0.156 -0.0253669 0.1586359 
Constant -0.3859561 0.2662232 -.145 0.147 -0.907744 0.1358319 
Adjusted R-squared 0.9425      
Wald chi-squared 54794.21      
Prob > chi-squared 0.0000      
Rho 0.0376715      
Observations 1081      
Groups 108      
*=p<0.1, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01 
 
 
                                                 
14 See Appendix for states included in the model. Asia and Pacific are the omitted reference categories. 
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Like some of the other models, the sub-Saharan Africa regional dummy variable 
is positive and significant. Again, states in sub-Saharan Africa are more likely to be less 
corrupt than the omitted region. The coefficient for Latin America and the Caribbean 
approaches the threshold for significance (p < 0.102) and is negative. Latin American and 
Caribbean states may be more corrupt than the omitted region. 
The second export model is the ores and metals exports model (Table 8). The 
relationship between ores and metals exports and corruption is hard to predict. While 
capital intensive and asset specific, ores and metals rents are not non-renewable resources 
and are, in general, not as scarce. Therefore, they may not be a systematic relationship 
between these exports and corruption. The results from the regression show that ores and 
metals exports are not systematically related to perceived levels of corruption, as 
suggested by the coefficient 
 Of the institutional independent variables, the coefficient for the Polity is positive 
and significant. A higher level of democracy is again associated with lower levels of 
perceived corruption. The economic variables perform as expected. Openness and gross 
domestic product demonstrate the same relationship as they have in most of the models. 
A higher degree of openness and a higher average wage are associated with lower levels 
of perceived corruption. The coefficient for Latin American and Caribbean states is 
negative and significant, suggesting that states in this region are more likely to have 
higher levels of perceived corruption compared to the omitted region. 
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Summarizing the Results 
 With all the models covered, it is now possible to make comparisons across the 
models. Table 9 presents the findings for various covariates across the different models. 
The table shows the number of times a covariate achieved statistical significance (by 
level of significance). The study draws upon this table to review the hypotheses. In 
particular, this study uses these results to examine whether the statistical findings lend 
support to each hypothesis. 
Table 9: Statistical Significance Counter 
Levels of Significance p<|0.1| p<|0.05| p<|0.01| Total 
Total Rents 
 
0 0 1 1 
Coal Rents 
 
0 1 0 1 
Forest Rents 
 
0 0 0 0 
Mineral Rents 
 
0 0 0 0 
Natural Gas Rents 
 
0 1 0 1 
Oil Rents 
 
0 0 1 1 
Fuel Exports 
 
0 0 1 1 
Ores and Metals Exports 
 
0 0 0 0 
Polity2 
 
2 4 1 7 
Regime Durability 
 
0 1 0 1 
Polity*Durability 
 
1 0 0 1 
Government Consumption 
 
0 0 0 0 
Openness 
 
3 2 0 5 
Ethno linguistic Fractionalization 
 
1 0 0 1 
Log of Population 
 
0 0 0 0 
Log GDPPC Con 2005  
 
1 0 7 8 
Central Asia 
 
0 0 0 0 
Eastern and Southeastern Europe 
 
0 0 0 0 
Latin America and Caribbean 
 
1 0 0 1 
Middle East and North Africa 
 
0 0 0 0 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
0 0 0 0 
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Hypothesis One: Capital intensive and non-renewable natural resource 
endowments should demonstrate a positive association with perceptions of corruption. 
 
Hypothesis Two: A greater reliance on fuel exports relative to total exports should 
be associated with higher levels of corruption. 
 
 After reviewing the results of the statistical models, this study provides data in 
support of hypothesis one and two. Coal rents, natural gas rents, oil rents, and fuel 
exports all demonstrated a clear relationship with perceptions of corruption, while forest 
rents, mineral rents, and ores and metals exports did not. This finding shows that capital 
intensity may not matter. Rather, the primary driver of corruption may the non-renewable 
nature of energy rents and exports. 
 Why might this be? Actors on both sides of a corrupt exchange are well aware of 
the eventual fate of coal, natural gas, and oil extraction and production. These resources 
are non-renewable and have a short time horizon. This can alter the incentive structure in 
which bureaucrats, politicians, and private actors interact within. Knowing that the 
resource will eventually be depleted, bureaucrats and politicians may be more willing to 
solicit and accept bribes. This could be out of self-interest or out of a desire to make sure 
that some of the money to be made from these resources will make it back to their 
communities. 
 Another explanation may be found on the firm side. Anticipating high profit 
margins in the long term, with energy demands increasing every year, firms may be 
79 
 
willing to pay out bribes to any state actor that can increase their likelihood of obtaining a 
permit or to obtain ownership of an energy resource. Considering the profits at stake, 
firms may be willing to pay absorbent bribes. The size of the bribe could change the 
likelihood of a bureaucrat or a politician to accept it or decline it. 
 Granted, the decision for a bureaucrat to defect depends on other variables as 
well. The probably of getting caught and the subsequent punishment involved could be a 
strong influencing agent against corruption. The moral or ethical standards of an 
individual bureaucrat or politician also matter in this regard. Hypothetically, there may be 
agents that are simply incorruptible. The existence of these rents, however, can alter the 
incentive structure for all actors, making corruption on average more likely. 
 
 Hypothesis Three: Higher levels of democracy should be associated with lower 
levels of corruption. 
 
 Hypothesis Four: The interaction variable of democracy and regime durability, 
with higher scores being related to long standing democracies and lower scores being 
associated with long standing autocracies, should have a negative effect on corruption. 
 
 Analysis of Table 9 shows that the Polity measure of regime type is significant in 
seven out of eight models. Therefore, this study provides fairly robust evidence in 
support of hypothesis three. 
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There are many theoretical reasons why democracy should reduce levels of 
perceived corruption. The first reason relates to the function that democracy performs. 
Democratic systems of government place pressure on public officials to be accountable or 
they will be disciplined at the polls. Corruption and the negative consequences attributed 
to it can and should serve as a reason for a polity to become disaffected and vote out 
officials that are seen to be corrupt. Elections can also give incentives to politicians to 
discipline or clean up bureaucracies that are viewed as being corrupt.  
 Aside from the mechanical aspects of democracy, there are associated 
characteristics of democratic regimes that can be associated with lower levels of 
corruption. Freedom of the press is an important political right in democratic systems. A 
free press can investigate corruption and expose it without fear of retribution. Therefore, 
the more press freedoms, the more likely corruption can be exposed and corrected. 
 Being accountable to the people, democratic regimes are also more likely to have 
more transparency. This could include maintaining a system for entering documents and 
information into public record. This enables interactions between agents and firms to be 
open to scrutiny. Public hearings and open bidding processes are other examples of types 
of transparency that can make corruption easier to identify and expose. 
 Unlike hypothesis three, hypothesis four should be rejected. Statistical evidence 
does not support a relationship between regime type and regime durability and levels of 
perceived corruption. Theoretically, there may be no link between regime durability and 
corruption. While a great deal of the variation in corruption is explained by the level of 
corruption the previous year, this may have nothing to do with the longevity of a regime. 
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Rather, the relationship could have more to do with the underlying incentive structures 
and expectations of behavior that exist within a bureaucracy or an industry. It is quite 
possible that linkages between a given regime and bureaucracy or industry may be weak, 
such that one does not have much of an impact on the other. 
 
Hypothesis Five: Higher levels of openness should be associated with lower levels 
of corruption. 
 
 Hypothesis Six: Higher levels of government consumption spending as a 
percentage of total consumption spending should be associated with higher levels of 
corruption. 
 
 Hypothesis Seven: A higher gross domestic product per capita should be 
associated with lowers levels of corruption. 
 
 The findings of the various statistical models provide support for hypothesis five 
and seven. A higher degree of openness was associated with lower levels of perceived 
corruption in five of the eight models. A higher level of gross domestic product per capita 
was associated with lower levels of corruption in all eight of the models. Nevertheless, 
hypothesis six cannot be confirmed based upon the statistical evidence. 
 Openness is associated with lower levels of corruption. The more open an 
economy is to trade, the more it is exposed to international prices. If corruption is 
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internalized as a cost of business, this cost will be reflected in the price of a good. 
Therefore, ceteris paribus, a “clean” good should be priced at a lower level than a “dirty” 
good. Over time, firms that are engaged in corruption should be out priced by more 
efficient competitors. This could vary based upon market structure, however. Under 
conditions of perfect competition, this would certainly be the case. In market structures in 
which the firm has more market power, like oligopoly or monopolistic competition, this 
effect may be mitigated or not as pronounced. Cartel style practices, such as those of 
OPEC member states and diamond firms, could mitigate the effect of openness through 
their influence on the supply of goods. 
 A higher level of gross domestic product per capita influences the underlying 
incentive structure that exists within an economy to engage in corruption. Higher per 
capita income tends to be associated with higher wages. A higher wage level, in general, 
should reduce the incentive to engage in corruption by reducing the relative payoff. 
Granted, much of this depends on the probability of getting caught and the punishment 
associated with getting caught. Yet gross domestic product per capita can also offer 
insight into state capacity. A higher level of gross domestic product per capita reflects a 
larger tax base from which a state can procure resources. These resources can be 
mobilized to create a more capable and powerful state. This capacity could be reflected in 
a state having adequate monitoring capabilities with respect to enforcing the law and 
policing relations between state officials and firms.  
 Based on the findings of this study, it appears that higher levels of government 
spending are not associated with higher levels perceived corruption. While a larger pool 
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of government consumption may increase the opportunities to engage in graft, the 
likelihood of an actor doing so may depend more on the opportunity cost and the 
probability of getting caught, which captured in the gross domestic product per capita 
measure. 
 
 Hypothesis Eight: A higher level of ethno linguistic fractionalization should be 
associated with higher levels of corruption. 
 
 Hypothesis Nine: A larger population should be associated with higher levels of 
corruption. 
 
 Hypothesis Eleven: States located in Eastern and South Eastern Europe should 
have higher levels of corruption due to the transition from state socialism to market 
capitalism. 
 
 Hypothesis Twelve: States located in Latin America and the Caribbean should 
have higher levels of corruption due to the region’s common history with neopopulist 
modes of rule. 
 
 Hypothesis Thirteen: States located in Northern Africa and the Middle East should 
have higher levels of corruption due to the region’s common history with sultanistic 
modes of rule. 
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Hypothesis Fourteen: States located in Sub-Saharan Africa should have higher 
levels of corruption due to the region’s common history with neo-patrimonial modes of 
rule. 
 
  Based upon the findings of this study, the data do not provide support for 
hypotheses eight through fourteen. The socio cultural measures, ethno linguistic 
fractionalization and population size, are not statistically related to perceptions of 
corruption in enough of the statistical models to suggest confirmation. The regional 
dummy variables are not significant in enough models to confirm hypotheses ten through 
thirteen. The coefficient for the regional dummy variable for sub-Saharan Africa was 
significant in three of the eight statistical models, but the relationship was in the opposite 
direction. While the comparative literature did not suggest a basis for higher levels of 
corruption in Asia Pacific outside of autocratic practices (which is captured by the Polity 
measure for regime type), the Asia Pacific region may not serve as an adequate omitted 
category for comparison. Future studies may benefit from including OECD states and 
using OECD member states as the omitted category. 
 Theoretically, ethno linguistic cleavages in a given society can provide a basis 
from which identity is formed. If these cleavages are strong and meaningful, interactions 
between groups may be infrequent and fraught with mistrust. At the aggregate level, this 
could lead to a situation in which group favoritism corrupts state policy. Specifically, 
bureaucrats or politicians may utilize their positions of power or authority to skew the 
distribution of goods or services. 
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 The ability to do so, however, is primarily a function of other interceding factors. 
First and foremost is the regime type. Democratic systems of government and their 
associated characteristics can prevent systematic discrimination from developing. The 
first characteristics are a free press and free speech. As covered above, these allow such 
corrupt and discriminating activities to be identified and corrected. Another characteristic 
of democratic systems of government is equality under the law. Democracies typically 
embrace a rational-legalistic position which separates the individual from the office they 
hold. This is usually mandated by law with punishments for violation. 
 The ability of ethno linguistic fractionalization to influence corruption is also 
dependent upon the overall wealth of a state, which can be operationalized by using gross 
domestic product per capita. First, a wealthier state is likely to have greater capacity to 
enforce the law, which will change the opportunity cost of engaging in corrupt or 
discriminatory practices.  Second, a higher gross domestic product per capita is bound to 
be associated with a higher wage level throughout the state. State bureaucrats are likely to 
benefit from that as well. A higher wage level can alter the incentive structure of 
engaging in a corrupt act for reasons explained above. Lastly, to engage in discriminatory 
corruption it is necessary to have a pool of goods and services to distribute from. 
Therefore, ethno linguistic fractionalization can be interceded by the size of government 
spending and the availability of rents. 
 The population size of a country was thought to influence the incentive structure 
facing a bureaucrat or politician wanting to engage in a corrupt act. A larger pool of 
people depending on the goods or services increases the potential profit that can be made 
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from engaging in corruption. Much like ethno linguistic fractionalization, the underlying 
incentive structure is influenced by other factors. The ability of population size to 
influence levels or corruption is also relative to the level of poverty. In a state with a large 
population but a low level of wealth, the incentive to engage in corruption may very well 
be enhanced. In a state with a large population and a high level of wealth, on the other 
hand, the incentive structure may not be changed at all. 
 As stated above, the results for the regional dummy variables were not consistent 
enough to provide support for hypotheses ten through thirteen. Regime characteristics 
may indeed play an influencing role on the culture of politics and the behaviors and 
norms that develop within bureaucracies and political systems. However, the evidence 
from this study suggests that other factors have a stronger relationship with perceptions 
of corruption. Higher levels of democracy, trade openness, and gross domestic product 
per capita all have the ability to reduce many of the negative aspects of neo-
patrimonialism, neopopulism, sultanistic rule, and the transition to a market economy 
from state socialism. Democratic governance, over time, can make a regime more 
accountable to the needs of the enfranchised population. This, along with the press 
freedoms and transparency associated with democratic governance, can provide the 
populace with a mechanism to undermine the clientelistic networks that lay at the heart of 
neo-patrimonialism, neopopulism, and sultanistic rule. Trade openness, through the 
pressure of the price mechanism, can reduce the ability of corrupt firms, if the cost of 
corruption is internalized into the price of a good, to remain competitive. 
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Conclusion 
 The statistical models from this chapter show that non-renewable natural 
resources are statistically related to higher levels of perceived corruption while 
controlling for other relevant variables. This confirms the main theoretical expectation of 
this study. Furthermore, this study finds that a higher level of democratic governance, 
trade openness, and gross domestic product per capita are all associated with lower levels 
of perceived corruption. Taken together, these variables show that incentives structures, 
most of which can be considered economic incentives, seem to have the most influence 
over levels of perceived corruption. 
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Chapter Seven 
Policy Implications and Conclusions 
 This study has demonstrated that there is some merit to the resource curse, 
although the curse may not be as robust as it has been made out to be. Through the 
literature review on the resource curse theory, it is clear that studies have found that a 
reliance on natural resource earnings does have a negative relationship with economic 
growth. The findings in the literature are so consistent that a formal test of this 
relationship was not necessary for this study. 
 With regard to the relationship between corruption and natural resource 
endowments, the findings of this study partially confirm the resource curse theory. 
Consistent with what was expected by this study, perceptions of corruption are related to 
the more capital intensive and non-renewable resources. Coal rents, oil rents, natural gas 
rents, and fuel exports all demonstrate a significant relationship with perceptions of 
corruption at the systemic level. The less capital intensive and renewable natural 
resources demonstrate no statistical relationship with corruption. 
What are the broader implications of these findings? Citizens and policy makers 
alike should pay close attention to the institutions and structures that regulate capital 
intensive and non-renewable industries. Specifically, mechanisms should be in place to 
minimize the ability to engage in corrupt behavior. One such strategy has been adopted 
by Norway since the discovery of hydrocarbons in the late 1960s. When designing the 
institutions that would manage the oil sector, Norway specifically separated the 
commercial side, the policy side, and the regulatory side of the industry from one another 
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(Thurber, et. al., 2011). The strength of this reform is that is separates the various powers 
from one another, making it more difficult to corrupt the sector as a whole. If just one 
aspect became corrupt, the other two can work to correct this problem. Democratic 
institutions and a professional bureaucracy work to reinforce this arrangement. Whether 
this arrangement would survive in an autocratic regime or with an underdeveloped 
bureaucracy is unknown. This is due to the many challenges facing developing states. 
Norway has the legal institutions and the resources to implement and monitor such a 
division of labor within the bureaucratic structures that govern the hydrocarbon industry. 
Furthermore, the state government is already rated as clean by Transparency International 
and the state does embraces the Weberian model of an ideal, rational-legal bureaucracy. 
Implementing this strategy without taking into account the differences in state capacity 
and enforcement could be problematic. The core finds of this study are that micro-level 
incentive structures have the greatest influences on outcomes related to corruption 
Another possible strategy to combat corruption in the non-renewable resource 
sector is to design institutional mechanisms to promote openness and transparency. After 
all, corruption thrives in situations with information asymmetry. There are several points 
in the relationship between a state and a firm engaged in the non-renewable sectors that 
require scrutiny. The first point is the bidding and licensing process that a firm must go 
through to obtain the right to explore or extract. The second point is during the creation of 
the contractual arrangement between the firm and the state. The third point is during 
revenue management, revenue collection and revenue distribution. The fourth point 
relates to the governance structure of the bureaucratic structures charged with monitoring 
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the industry. 
The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) represents an avenue 
states can pursue to aid in this endeavor. Founded in 2003, EITI is a mutli-stakeholder 
initiative that involves states, multinational firms, state owned enterprises, international 
financial organizations, and civil society groups interested in increasing transparency in 
the extractive sector. This initiative is voluntary and enables independent verification of 
dealings within the extractive sector of a state (Al Faruque, 2006:70-73). Twenty states 
are currently members, though this study does not test to see whether membership in 
EITI is effective in reducing perceptions of corruption. 
Lastly, the statistical findings of this study offer insights into how to combat 
corruption in the extractive sector of the economy. First and foremost, the extractive 
sector should be exposed to democratic oversight and the scrutiny of a free press. Second, 
the sector should be open to competition. Third, we should ensure that bureaucrats 
working in the sector responsible for governance of the extractive sector are well 
compensated to reduce the incentive to engage in corruption. The statistical models of 
this study suggest that these strategies should help to lower corruption over time. 
There are limitations to these findings, however. Based on the findings of this 
study and based upon theoretical reasoning, the greatest predictor of perceptions of 
corruption in a given state is the level of perceived corruption in the previous year. 
Therefore, a long term view is required to provide the maximum amount of leverage on 
the research question. This study attempts to make use of the best data available, but 
coverage of the CPI only runs from 1994 until the present day. As more data is collected, 
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this study can be replicated to retest the various hypotheses. 
A second limitation of this study is an inability to completely trace the causal 
relationship between wealth and corruption. There is a circular relationship between the 
two concepts. Corruption reduces economic growth. Low levels of economic 
development increase corruption. This creates a vicious cycle in which states can get 
trapped in a poverty/corruption trap. How can scholars and policy makers properly 
address this problem? Reducing corruption in the relevant bureaucratic structures seems 
to be the most cost effective strategy. If a bureaucracy in a given state could be cleaned 
up, it could shape the expectations of firms and citizens over time. An independent 
monitoring system, perhaps implemented by an impartial nongovernmental organization, 
may be able to assist in this endeavor. 
A third limitation to this study is that the model can only be applied to sectors that 
are capital intensive and involve non-renewable resources facing an increasing demand 
curve. Natural resources seem to be the only goods that can be described in this manner. 
These resources are then inputs to the creation of other goods and services. Therefore, 
this theoretical model can only be adequately applied in the primary sector of the 
economy. The consequences of the corruption that occurs in these sectors does have an 
impact in the broader economy, but this model cannot predict and assess those impacts. 
Key questions still remain about the resource curse, however. This opens up 
opportunities for further research. First, how does the number of firms in a sector interact 
with perceptions of corruption? Does having more firms in a sector make corruption 
worse or does it lessen corruption? Theoretically, having more firms in a given sector 
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should reduce the leverage of each individual firm within the sector due to reduced 
market power. This study did not incorporate data on the number of firms in a sector and 
could be strengthened by doing do. Second, how does the ownership of the firms affect 
corruption? Are state owned firms or private firms more likely to produce higher levels of 
perceived corruption? State owned enterprises and private firms could operate under a 
different system of logic, therefore changing the manner in which they interact with 
bureaucracies. A coding system for determining the degree of state ownership versus 
private ownership could be incorporated into this study to shed light on this relationship. 
Do foreign firms behave differently than domestic firms? Foreign firms are less 
accountable to the host state, thereby reducing the costs of engaging in corruption. Again, 
data may be available to incorporate this into the paper and test whether foreign or 
domestic firms have a different impact on the overall level of perceived corruption. Each 
of these questions could provide an excellent opportunity for scholars to tease out more 
nuances. 
 In closing, the resource curse theory should be revised. Based on the findings of 
this study, the resource curse theory would be more appropriately named a fuel curse 
theory. Coal rents, natural gas rents, oil rents, and fuel exports were the only rent 
measures to have consistent findings with respect to corruption. This is due to two 
primary factors. The first is asset specificity. These industries are capital intensive and 
asset specific. This makes firms in these sectors extremely sensitive to state policy as they 
cannot simply transfer capital from one industry to another. Second, these resources are 
non-renewable and have a fixed quantity. As energy demands continue to grow and 
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supply continues to diminish, the price will continue to increase unless alternative 
sources of energy capable of meeting demand are developed. In light of this reality, actors 
in these industries are able to take advantage of the scarcity of the resource to extract 
bribes. The ability to do so is, according to this study, primarily a function of the existing 
incentive structure. Reducing corruption, therefore, is related to changing the incentive 
structure faced by actors in that arena. 
 The resource curse is not a permanent problem that natural resource rich state 
must endure forever. Rather, sound policy and public scrutiny can work to mitigate this 
curse and ensure that the citizens of resource rich states can benefit from their resource 
endowments. Economists and political scientists alike can make a meaningful difference 
in the lives of many of the world’s peoples by joining this endeavor and working to 
promote non-renewable sectors that are efficient, transparent, and incorruptible.  
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Appendix 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table A1: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Corruption Perception 
 
1719 3.40395 1.476763 0.4 9.4 
Total Rents 
 
2569 10.80973 18.98548 0 214.4921 
Coal Rents 
 
850 0.5346659 1.421448 0 22.93144 
Forest Rents 
 
2319 1.822632 3.152807 0 47.45462 
Mineral Rents 
 
2569 1.010284 3.563341 0 54.16282 
Natural Gas Rents 
 
1731 3.152331 12.00562 0 173.2019 
Oil Rents 
 
1754 8.832046 16.40206 0 105.95 
Fuel Exports 
 
1810 17.91296 29.00962 0 99.73948 
Ores and Metals Exports 
 
1897 8.358205 15.2242 0 86.53964 
Polity2 
 
2361 1.797543 6.438339 -10 10 
Regime Durability 
 
2409 16.60399 18.22518 0 97 
Polity*Durability 
 
2361 2.911055 205.176 -970 920 
Government Consumption 
 
2596 13.04276 9.283947 0.9 67.19 
Openness 
 
2696 84.21693 44.84393 1.8 433.05 
Ethno linguistic Fractionalization 
 
2850 0.4783032 0.2492972 0 0.9302 
Log of Population 
 
2804 15.33619 2.105447 9.125653 21.01901 
Log GDPPC Con 2005  
 
2596 8.207052 1.203956 5.080162 11.82269 
Central Asia 
 
2960 0.0513514 0.2207507 0 1 
Eastern and Southeastern Europe 
 
2960 0.1114865 0.3147868 0 1 
Latin America and Caribbean 
 
2960 0.02043919 0.4033247 0 1 
Middle East and North Africa 
 
2960 0.1273649 0.3334376 0 1 
Sub-Saharan Africa 2960 0.3087838 0.4620698 0 1 
 
Regional Dummy Assignments 
Central Asia: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan 
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Eastern and Southeastern Europe: Albania, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, 
Croatia, Cyprus, Estonia, Kosovo, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Malta, Moldova, 
Montenegro, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Ukraine 
 
Latin America and the Caribbean: Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, 
Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, 
Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent 
and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, Venezuela 
 
Middle East and North Africa: Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, 
Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, 
Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Yemen 
 
Sub-Saharan Africa: Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape 
Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo (Brazzeville), Congo 
(Kinshasa), Cote d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, 
Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, 
Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, 
Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, South Sudan, Sudan, 
Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe 
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Model One 
Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, 
Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, 
Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, 
Comoros, Congo (Brazzeville), Congo (Kinshasa), Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivoire, Croatia, 
Cuba, Cyprus, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial 
Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, 
Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jamaica, 
Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, 
Liberia, Libya, Lithuania, Macedonia, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, 
Mauritius, Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, 
Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, 
Philippines, Qatar, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, 
Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, 
Suriname, Swaziland, Syria, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, 
Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, 
Venezuela, Vietnam, Zambia, Zimbabwe 
 
Model Two 
Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cameroon, 
Chile, China, Colombia, Congo (Kinshasa), Croatia, Egypt, Estonia, Georgia, India, 
Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Macedonia, Malaysia, Mongolia, 
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Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Niger, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Romania, Russia, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Ukraine, 
Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Vietnam, Zambia, Zimbabwe 
 
Model Three 
Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, 
Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, 
Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, 
Comoros, Congo (Brazzeville), Congo (Kinshasa), Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivoire, Croatia, 
Cuba, Cyprus, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial 
Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, 
Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jamaica, 
Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, 
Liberia, Libya, Lithuania, Macedonia, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, 
Mauritius, Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, 
Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, 
Philippines, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, 
Swaziland, Syria, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, 
Uganda, Ukraine, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Vietnam, Zambia, Zimbabwe 
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Model Four 
Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, 
Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, 
Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, 
Comoros, Congo (Brazzeville), Congo (Kinshasa), Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivoire, Croatia, 
Cuba, Cyprus, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial 
Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, 
Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jamaica, 
Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, 
Liberia, Libya, Lithuania, Macedonia, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, 
Mauritius, Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, 
Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, 
Philippines, Qatar, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, 
Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, 
Suriname, Swaziland, Syria, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, 
Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, 
Venezuela, Vietnam, Zambia, Zimbabwe 
 
Model Five 
Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, 
Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Cameroon, Chile, China, 
Colombia, Congo (Brazzeville), Congo (Kinshasa), Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivoire, Croatia, 
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Cuba, Cyprus, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, 
Ethiopia, Gabon, Georgia, Ghana, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran, 
Iraq, Israel, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lebanon, 
Libya, Lithuania, Macedonia, Malaysia, Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, 
Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, 
Philippines, Qatar, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Singapore, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, 
Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, 
Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Vietnam, Zambia, Zimbabwe 
 
Model Six 
Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, 
Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Cameroon, Chad, Chile, China, 
Colombia, Congo (Brazzeville), Congo (Kinshasa), Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivoire, Croatia, 
Cuba, Cyprus, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, 
Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Gabon, Georgia, Ghana, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, India, 
Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, 
Latvia, Lebanon, Libya, Lithuania, Macedonia, Malaysia, Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, 
Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New 
Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, 
Senegal, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan, 
Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, United 
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Arab Emirates, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Vietnam, Zambia, Zimbabwe 
 
Model Seven 
Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Benin, 
Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape 
Verde, Central African Republic, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivoire, 
Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, 
Estonia, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, 
Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, 
Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lebanon, Lithuania, Macedonia, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, 
Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, 
Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, 
Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, 
Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, 
Syria, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukraine, United 
Arab Emirates, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Vietnam, Zambia, Zimbabwe 
 
Model Eight 
Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Benin, 
Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape 
Verde, Central African Republic, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivoire, 
Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, 
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Estonia, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, 
Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, 
Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lebanon, Lithuania, Macedonia, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, 
Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, 
Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, 
Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, 
Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, 
Syria, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukraine, United 
Arab Emirates, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Vietnam, Zambia, Zimbabwe 
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Research Experience 
Monitoring and Evaluation Researcher    May 2013 – Present 
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·Research Nevada’s implementation of its new economic development plan. 
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 · Provided direct instruction and concept modeling to students. 
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· Graded all of the weekly assignments and the quizzes that were given in the 
course. 
 · Proctored all examinations. 
 · Kept records on the weekly assignments and the quizzes. 
· Assisted with field trips to Red Rock Canyon, Hoover Dam, and Zion National 
Park. 
· Held office hours for students that needed additional guidance on the material. 
· Covered the course for five weeks while the instructor recovered from surgery. 
· Oversaw a field trip to Hoover Dam while the instructor recovered from surgery. 
 
Undergraduate Political Science Course  Survey of Political Theory 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas   Jan 2012 – May 2012 
 · Uploaded all texts needed for the class on the e-reserve system. 
 · Proctored all examinations. 
· Held office hours for students that needed additional guidance on the material. 
· Compiled data on what political theory courses were being taught at top tier 
political science programs in the United States. 
 
Undergraduate Political Science Course  Late Modern Political Theory 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas   Jan 2012 – May 2012 
 · Uploaded all texts needed for the class on the e-reserve system. 
 · Summarized two works by Immanuel Kant for the benefit of students. 
 · Proctored all examinations. 
· Held office hours for students that needed additional guidance on the material. 
 
Undergraduate Political Science Course  Introduction to American Politics 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas   Apr 2012 
· Lectured in two sections on the philosophical foundations of capitalism, supply 
and demand curves, aggregate supply, aggregate demand, financial markets, 
goods markets, price setting, wage setting, the deficit, and the financial crisis of 
2007. 
 
Undergraduate Political Science Course  Early Modern Political Theory 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas   Aug 2011 – Dec 2011 
 · Uploaded all texts needed for the class on the e-reserve system. 
 · Surveyed all recent scholarship on the texts covered in class. 
 · Proctored all examinations. 
· Held office hours for students that needed additional guidance on the material. 
 
 
 
113 
 
Teaching Experience (Continued) 
Undergraduate Political Science Course  Introduction to American Politics 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas   Nov 2011 
· Lectured in two sections on the philosophical foundations of capitalism, supply 
and demand curves, aggregate supply, aggregate demand, financial markets, 
goods markets, price setting, wage setting, the deficit, and the financial crisis of 
2007. 
 
Middle School Social Studies Course  All Subjects 
High Performance Junior Academy   Mar 2011 – Jun 2011 
· Worked in conjunction with Nevada Virtual Academy to deliver instruction to 
students. 
· Developed personalized lesson plans for students ranging from Middle School to 
High School. 
 · Graded all tests and assignments. 
 · Taught lessons in mathematics, writing, reading, history, and geography. 
 
High School Social Studies Course   World History 
Clark High School     Jan 2011 – Feb 2011 
 · Lectured students on world history starting with the industrial revolution. 
 · Led discussions about philosophical positions on various issues. 
 · Graded assignments and quizzes. 
 · Related democratic revolutions of the 19th century to the Arab Spring. 
 
Middle School Social Studies Course  World Geography 
Fremont Middle School    Jan 2010 – May 2010 
 · Lectured students on the geography of Eastern Europe and Asia. 
· Reinforced students’ knowledge of latitude and longitude using a March 
Madness lesson. 
 · Assisted with data entry concerning standardized tests. 
 · Integrated latest technologies to help teach students. 
 
High School Social Studies Course   United States Government 
Chaparral High School    Aug 2009 – Dec 2009 
 · Lectured students on the philosophical roots of the Enlightenment. 
 · Reinforced students’ knowledge of maps, keys, legends, and charts. 
 · Provided assistance to bilingual students to help develop writing skills. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
114 
 
Work Experience 
Senior Ambassador       Jan 2007 – Aug 2011 
UNLV Career Services Department     Las Vegas, NV 
 · Maintained the UNLV Careerlink data base. 
 · Networked with employers in the Las Vegas community. 
· Processed payments for the UNLV Career Day and the UNLV Fall Marketplace. 
 · Compiled end of the year reports for the Student Services Cluster. 
· Analyzed data for office traffic, library use, employment rates and wages for 
graduating students. 
· Provided guidance to students on resume, cover letter, and curriculum vitae 
writing. 
· Responsible for creating the work schedule and hiring new student workers. 
 · Conducted regular inventories on office supplies. 
 · Responsible for ordering all office supplies. 
 · Maintained the computer lab and processed all work order requests. 
 
Extracurricular Activities 
Political Science Department Representative   Aug 2012 – May 2013 
Graduate and Professional Student Association   Las Vegas, NV 
· Sat in on all meetings of the Graduate and Professional Student Association. 
 · Member of the Faculty Senate Fiscal Affairs Committee. 
· Member of the Graduate and Professional Student Research Forum Committee. 
 · Member of the Government Relations Committee. 
 
Achievements and Awards 
UNLV Access Grant - 2011, 2012, 2013 
Dean’s Honor List - 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 
Praxis II Principles of Learning Test Achievement Award - 2011 
Praxis II Social Studies Content Knowledge Achievement Award - 2011 
Golden Key International Honour Society - 2010 
Outstanding Customer Service and Administrative Support - 2009 
 
Computer Skills 
 Microsoft Office products, Open Office products, SPSS, STATA 
 
